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LAW, LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP AND THE CONSERVATION OF  
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY: 2020 VISION AND BEYOND 
Michael Bowman 
 
1.  Introduction 
It can hardly be doubted that the current state of the world’s biological diversity provides cause for 
the gravest possible concern. As was candidly conceded by a wide-ranging survey prepared by the 
CBD Secretariat for the purposes of the International Year which the UN had originally dedicated to 
the topic,1 
The target agreed by the world’s Governments in 2002, ‘to achieve by 2010 a significant 
reduction of the current rate of biodiversity loss at the global, regional and national level 
as a contribution to poverty alleviation and to the benefit of all life on Earth’, has not 
been met. 
 
The evidence of this failure was all around. Many of those species whose prospects of survival had 
been formally assessed were moving closer to extinction, with coral species experiencing the most 
rapid rate of deterioration and amphibians facing the greatest risk generally. Nearly a quarter of all 
plant species were judged to be threatened with extinction, while population surveys suggested that 
the overall abundance of vertebrate species had fallen by nearly one third between 1970 and 2006, 
and was still falling, with the severest declines occurring in the tropics and amongst freshwater 
species. Despite some successes in slowing the process, natural habitats generally continued to 
decline in both extent and integrity. The services provided by forests, rivers and other natural 
ecosystems had progressively been compromised by fragmentation and degradation, while the 
genetic diversity of crops and livestock in agricultural systems remained in decline. The five principal 
drivers of biodiversity loss – habitat change, overexploitation, pollution, invasive alien species and 
climate change – were either undiminished or actually increasing in intensity. In sum, humanity’s 
ecological footprint exceeded the biological capacity of the Earth by an even wider margin than at 
the time the 2010 target was originally agreed.2 This failure was acknowledged by the decision of the 
UN to follow the International Year of Biodiversity with the devotion of an entire decade to the 
global conservation project,3 in the hopes of achieving significant progress, if not actually turning 
things around, by the year 2020. 
We are now effectively half way through the decade in question, and there are still disturbingly few 
signs of the progress required.  The latest major survey prepared by WWF, which announces itself to 
be ‘not for the faint-hearted’,4 suggests that since 1970 (i.e., in less than two human generations) 
                                                          
1 CBD Secretariat, Global Biodiversity Outlook 3 (2010), Executive Summary, at 9. 
2 Id. 
3 UNGA Resolution 65/161, specifying 2011-2020 for this purpose, in accordance with the current strategic 
plan of the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), (1992) 31 ILM 818. 
4 See <http://www.wwf.eu/media_centre/publications/living_planet_report/>.  The report itself (WWF, Living 
Planet Report 2014) is downloadable from this site.  
populations of vertebrate species globally have actually dropped by just over half.5  Nevertheless, it 
retains a degree of confidence that we can ‘close this destructive chapter in our history, and build a 
future where people can live and prosper in harmony with nature’.6  The CBD’s own most recent 
appraisal paints a broadly similar picture of the current state of biodiversity conservation as 
decidedly troubling, but not yet irredeemable.7  
It is certainly not easy to be optimistic about the prospects for securing the transformation needed, 
however, since all these unmistakeable indicators of deterioration have become apparent during the 
very period in which we have also experienced an exponential increase in our knowledge and 
understanding of the centrality of biodiversity conservation to the preservation of the planet’s life 
support systems, and hence of our ultimate absolute dependence upon the efforts that we make in 
that regard.8  Thus, although we cannot, on any objectively plausible basis, any longer claim 
ignorance either of the nature or importance of the task, or of the most viable approaches to its 
performance, it would seem that the foibles of human nature are such that in practice we continue 
to experience the greatest of difficulty in bringing ourselves to address these issues effectively or 
even, in some quarters, to acknowledge their existence or seriousness at all.  All endeavours to 
procure a committed and systematically rational response from humankind to challenges such as 
these have much in common with attempts to herd cats or to scoop up milk in the fingers: only a 
very small proportion of the total target, at best, seems likely to be secured.   
This sorry saga of progressive ecological impoverishment certainly cannot, however, be attributed to 
any lack of formal legal regulation of the problem, since it has now been the subject of transnational 
regulatory attention, if only in extremely piecemeal fashion initially, for the best part of 150 years, 
and over the last few decades in particular an elaborate network of multilateral treaty regimes has 
been assembled to address the symptoms on a much more systematic basis.  Over the course of that 
latter period, moreover, a significant body of legal scholarship devoted to the explication and 
analysis of the regimes in question has finally begun to emerge.9  These developments, it might have 
been supposed, were very definitely to be regarded as entries on the credit side of the balance sheet 
on which the global conservation account is recorded, but there are those, it would seem, whose 
enthusiasm for them is decidedly muted.  After all, if this substantial body of law has actually failed 
to counter the damaging trends towards biodiversity impoverishment which are mentioned above, 
then there must surely be grounds for questioning its efficacy.   
Thus, in a recent review essay prompted by the publication of a new edition of Lyster’s International 
Wildlife Law (hereafter Lyster),10 of which the present writer was a co-author, the California-based 
political scientist Geoffrey Wandesforde-Smith expressed the view that the world had lost its 
appetite for ‘making big splashes’ with new treaty regimes, and might currently even be more 
                                                          
5 The Index ‘measures more than 10,000 representative populations of mammals, birds, reptiles, amphibians 
and fish’.  
6 See the WWF website (n 4). 
7 CBD Secretariat, Global Biodiversity Outlook 4 (2014). 
8 In addition to the publications mentioned above, see also the 1980 World Conservation Strategy, devised by 
IUCN in collaboration with other interested organisations, and its 1991 revision, Caring for the Earth. 
9 The Journal of International Wildlife Law and Policy, published first by Kluwer International (1998-2002) and 
then by Taylor & Francis/Routledge has undoubtedly played a significant part in this process. 
10 MJ Bowman, PGG Davies and CJ Redgwell, Lyster’s International Wildlife Law (2nd edn., CUP, 2010).  The 
original volume was, of course, S Lyster, International Wildlife Law (Grotius, 1985). 
interested in conducting its international conservation endeavours ‘around, rather than through’ 
those that already exist.11 Accordingly, while he was fleetingly fulsome in his praise for the breadth, 
depth and quality of the analysis of the global conservation measures which the book contained,12 
his clear message was that this alone was not enough, and that the omission to address certain 
‘broader questions’ – such as the demand by environmentally-committed readers to know what they 
should do next in order to make a positive impact in this field – must be seen to reflect the lack of a 
strong and clear inspirational vision in the work as a whole. 
 
2.  The Vexed Question of Vision 
In the ordinary way, there is probably little to be gained from authors responding directly to reviews 
of their work, but in this particular case there are grounds for interpreting the essay as a calculated 
attempt to initiate a dialogue regarding the shape and direction that legal scholarship concerning 
biodiversity conservation should most profitably assume in the future.13 This is a project that might 
justly be regarded as important both from the perspective of its contribution to legal education and 
research, and in the light of its potential practical impact upon the conservation process itself. Such 
questions are moreover, especially pertinent to such a work as the present, given that these are the 
very issues that it seeks to explore and illuminate. In these circumstances, the challenge is not an 
easy one to ignore, notwithstanding the fact that the gauntlet has been thrown down in terms that 
are likely to generate certain misgivings.   
In particular, accusations of ‘lack of vision’ are nowadays all too likely to be interpreted merely as 
forlorn lamentations that others cannot be relied upon to share the speaker’s own singular, and very 
possibly idiosyncratic, perspective upon the world.14 A good part of the reason for that is doubtless 
that the word ‘vision’ itself became so devalued through systematic overuse in the self-serving 
rhetoric of political spin doctors and corporate PR operatives during that most wasteful, and wasted, 
of decades, the 1980s, that it is now less likely to serve as a source of inspiration than to provoke 
sighs of weary resignation or even cries of outright derision.15 Yet, given the undoubted seriousness 
of the issues to which the reviewer’s observations relate, it would surely be unforgiveable simply to 
give in to cynicism of this kind and thereby allow potentially important insights on his part to be 
marginalised or disregarded merely on account of the language in which his critique was couched. 
After all, the success of any political project would seem to require some reasonably clear sense of 
                                                          
11 G Wandesforde-Smith, ‘From Sleeping Treaties to the Giddy Insomnia of Global Governance: How Inter-
national Wildlife Law Makes Headway’ (2012) 15 JIWLP 80, at 93.  It is noticeable, however, that no real 
evidence is presented in support of this contention. 
12 Id., at 80, 90, 93-4. 
13 Thus, Professor Wandesforde-Smith not merely secured the publication of his review in the excellent journal 
of which he is currently associate editor, but took the additional step of sending copies to each of the authors 
of the new Lyster personally, as well as to its publishers, Cambridge University Press. 
14 In this vein, note the recent assertion by the Turkish President that the principal obstacle to Turkey’s full 
membership of the EU was not, in reality, any fault or shortcoming exhibited by Turkey itself but rather ‘the 
EU’s lack of vision’, reported in Anon, ‘Gül Accuses EU of Lacking Strategic Vision vis-à-vis Turkey’ Today’s 
Zaman (Istanbul, 27 September 2010), available at <http://www.todayszaman.com/>  
15 See further on this point RE Ellsworth, Leading with Purpose: The New Corporate Realities (Stanford UP, 
2002), 96-97: ‘Unfortunately, ... in recent years “vision” has taken the form of a management fad, and the 
term has become so widely used as to lose the essence of its meaning. Derisively, it has degenerated into “the 
vision thing”.’ 
what it is trying to achieve and how it is going to achieve it, and in ostensible recognition of that 
point the institutional organs of the biodiversity treaties themselves continue to invoke the notion of 
‘vision’ in their own policy pronouncements and planning arrangements.16     
At the same time, if his observations are to be given due weight, it will be helpful as a preliminary to 
pay closer attention to what we might reasonably mean when deploying the terminology of ‘vision’. 
It is, after all, an extremely wide-ranging and multi-faceted expression, applied with equal alacrity in 
everyday usage to both the process and the product of visual discernment, and in literal and 
metaphorical fashion alike: in this way it has come to embrace everything from general cognitive 
photo-sensitivity to sheer hallucination,17 incorporating along the way such notions as dreams for 
the future, conceptual blueprints, mission statements, and general far-sightedness or perspicacity. 
By way of application of the last of these senses, the expression ‘men of vision’ is commonly 
deployed (in somewhat sexist fashion, no doubt) to denote those who display extreme or unusual 
perspicuity in some particular respect, rather than those with merely average or commonplace 
capacities, or – as a simple, strictly literal interpretation would surely require – all those who are not 
actually blind.  
It is through such curious but commonplace linguistic processes that the word has come to be 
associated with the bestowal of an accolade, and the ensuing scramble to claim ‘visionary’ status has 
undoubtedly proved a further impediment to the achievement of clarity in usage. As one 
commentator has put it, with regard to the corporate context:18 
For many CEOs, having a vision is a prerequisite to being considered an enlightened, 
modern leader. Consequently, vision statements have blossomed. Company after 
company has drafted statements to hang on walls and to place in public relations 
materials disseminated to employees, shareholders and the public. The terms vision, 
purpose, mission, shared values and strategy are often used indiscriminately and even 
interchangeably. 
 
In an attempt to rescue the concept from this morass of misapplication, he continues: 
But what is vision? Vision is not something separate from purpose, mission, strategy, 
and shared values. It is the quality that is ingrained in each of these that defines a 
desired future state of the organization resulting from the fulfilment of the purposes and 
the strategy to get there. As John Young, Hewlett-Packard’s former CEO, observes, 
‘Vision is simply mission and purpose made tangible in people’s minds.’ It ‘refers to a 
vivid description of what it will be like when the mission is accomplished or the purpose 
fulfilled.’ Vision combines an unusual discernment of the competitive future with 
foresight and wisdom as to how the company can make a valued social contribution in 
tomorrow’s marketplace. This discernment and foresight are woven into the substance 
of the company’s purpose, mission, strategy and values and are not separate from these 
concepts. 
 
                                                          
16 GBO-4 (n 7), for example, speaks in terms of a ‘vision’ for biodiversity for the year 2050. 
17 As to the latter, see, e.g., K Williams, ‘My Psychedelic, Psychotic, Psychic and Spiritual Visions’ (2014), 
available at <http://www.near-death.com/resources/editorials/my-psychedic-psychotic-psychic-and-spiritual-
visions.html>, especially Part 3.   
18 Ellsworth (n 15). 
While this arguably represents a small step forward in terms of clarification, it still seems to leave a 
good deal to be desired, first of all because it risks overstating the specificity with which it is possible 
to make assessments about the needs and realities of ‘tomorrow’,19 let alone all those days which 
are (hopefully at least) to follow. In addition, the ‘marketplace’ is hardly a forum where any 
meaningful evaluation of future reality can be guaranteed to occur.20 Typically, a fundamental 
impediment to the development of a feasible and compelling agenda for the future is the failure to 
establish a sufficiently clear and accurate picture of the starting point for the process – that is, of the 
current condition and functional operations of the enterprise in question, in all their complexity. 
Ideally, moreover, this picture would be informed by a reasonably clear sense of how all these 
realities came about in historical terms. Indeed, until such a detailed and authentic appreciation of 
the status quo has been constructed, strategic planning for the future seems likely to prove largely 
futile.   
Where the preservation of biological diversity is concerned, one key aspect of the planning problem 
is that it may in some cases take only days or months, but in others possibly years or even decades,21 
before the full impacts of conservation measures become discernible on the ground, rendering it 
extremely difficult for the complex relationships of cause and effect to be successfully unravelled. A 
currently deteriorating position in the vigour or abundance of protected wildlife might as easily be 
the result of imprudent policies that were implemented in the past (and perhaps even in a previous 
century) as of those that are presently in effect, rendering it extremely unwise to treat declining 
populations per se as a justification for launching into some dramatic programme of normative 
reform.22 A further factor is that even if the substantive thrust of conservation law and policy is well-
judged, it may take a very long while before effective approaches to implementation and 
enforcement are fully operative, especially when the key mechanism to be employed is that of the 
criminal law.23 All too often, the lack of due seriousness with which such matters are treated means 
that offenders are encouraged to believe that they may flout the law with relative impunity.   
It is only very recently that indications have become apparent that the international community is 
finally beginning to wake up to the full seriousness of the problems involved.24 A further element of 
the difficulties to be faced here is that the majority of the principal threats to biodiversity are 
                                                          
19 On the significance of unpredictability for decision-making generally, see J Kay, Obliquity: Why Our Goals Are 
Best Achieved Indirectly (Profile Books, 2010). 
20 This is because within the traditional economic perspective future contingencies are heavily discounted: see 
A. Gillespie, International Environmental Law Policy and Ethics (2nd edn., OUP, 2014), Chapter 3. 
21 More realistically, some complex combination of the above interludes is likely to be involved.  
22 See, e.g., D Tilman, RM May et al., ‘Habitat Destruction and the Extinction Debt’ (1994) 371 Nature 65; A 
Helm, I Hanski and M Partel, ‘Slow Response of Plant Species Richness to Habitat Loss and Fragmentation” 
(2006) 9 Ecology Letters 72; M Kuussaari, R Bommarco et al., ‘Extinction Debt: A Challenge for Biodiversity 
Conservation’ (2009) 24 Trends in Ecology & Evolution 564; A Sang, T Teder et al., ‘Indirect Evidence for an 
Extinction Debt of Grassland Butterflies Half Century after Habitat Loss’ (2010) 143 Biological Conservation 
1405. 
23 For reports of an interesting array of promising recent developments in the prosecution of wildlife offences 
in the UK, see the RSPB’s investigations newsletter, Legal Eagle Issue No 75, March 2015. 
24 The declaration of the UN Decade for Biodiversity is one, along with the creation in 2012 of IPBES (the 
Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services), the initiation of the UN’s Harmony with 
Nature project (see n 103 below) and the recent recognition of wildlife crime as a threat both to sustainable 
development and to international peace and security, as to which see E McLellan, R Parry-Jones et al., Illicit 
Wildlife Trafficking: An Environmental, Economic and Social Issue (Perspectives, Issue No.14, UNEP, May 2014). 
actually attributable to factors and policies which originate entirely from outside what is typically 
regarded as the conservation sector, reinforcing the idea that the solution may lie not in the 
reconstruction or abandonment of existing conservation regimes but in the more effective 
integration and consolidation of their message across the governmental machine as a whole. 
 
2.1 Vision, Visionaries and the Risks of Revisionism 
Needless to say, it would make even less sense to contemplate some very drastic upheaval in 
existing conservation regimes where the weaknesses that had been attributed to them were actually 
the result of mere misunderstanding of their true substantive purport, past evolutionary 
development or current modes of operation. The point cannot be over-emphasised within the 
context of international wildlife law because, whereas there seems actually to be no shortage of 
extravagant and confidently-expressed proposals of a strategic character, a striking deficiency has 
always been apparent with regard to the establishment of anything resembling a complete, cogent 
and coherent picture of the current state of affairs and operations, and of precisely what the law is, 
and how it came to be so. Thus, a number of the earlier evaluations of the Ramsar Convention were 
gravely undermined by their failure to examine with sufficient precision or rigour the way in which 
the regime was actually operating and evolving in practice.25   
To take another example, when evaluating the proposition that the wildlife trade convention, 
CITES,26 would operate much more efficiently and effectively if its basic procedures were turned on 
their head, in the sense that the listing process should be reconceived so as to specify those species 
in which trade was permitted,27 it helps at least to be aware that just such a proposal was specifically 
examined and rejected as unworkable in the Convention’s early years.28 Otherwise, one might simply 
end up reinventing the wheel, and very possibly a square wheel at that! Similarly, when it is 
repeatedly asserted by certain cadres of commentator that the very adoption of a convention 
regulating the global wildlife trade was born largely of a failure to appreciate the importance of 
habitat loss as the critical overall threat to wildlife species,29 it becomes important to understand 
that the historical record lends no support whatsoever to this contention.30 Rather, it seems that 
uncritical enthusiasm in certain quarters for trade as a vehicle of human development has given rise 
to the promulgation of a largely imagined historical narrative to support the ideological 
                                                          
25 See, e.g., D Farrier and L Tucker, ‘Wise Use of Wetlands under the Ramsar Convention: A Challenge for 
Meaningful Implementation of International Law’ (2000) 12 JEL 21, in response to which the Ramsar Bureau 
took the unusual step of issuing a public rebuttal.  This comprised a letter to the editor of the journal in which 
the article was published and an internal paper commissioned by an Australian wetlands expert exposing the 
misapprehensions it was believed to contain.  
26 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 993 UNTS 243. 
27 E Couzens, ‘CITES at Forty: Never Too Late to Make Lifestyle Changes’ (2013) 22 RECIEL 311. 
28 See CITES Conf. 3.21; Docs. 3.30, 3.30.1; ML Ditkof, ‘International Trade in Endangered Species under CITES: 
Direct Listing vs Reverse Listing’ (1982) 15 Cornell International Law Journal 107.  Couzens, id., acknowledges 
the point only in his conclusions, at 322, but suggests that circumstances have changed since then. 
29 See, e.g., J Hutton and B Dickson (eds.), Endangered Species, Threatened Convention: The Past, Present and 
Future of CITES (Earthscan, 2000), at xv, 47, 129. 
30 For discussion, see MJ Bowman, ‘A Tale of Two CITES: Divergent Perspectives upon the Effectiveness of the 
Wildlife Trade Convention’ (2013) 22 RECIEL 228, 233-235. 
predispositions of its authors.31 As a final illustration, it has been relatively rare to encounter 
appraisals of the 1946 Whaling Convention that go beyond the recitation of trite, and largely 
inaccurate, suppositions about its origins and objectives.32 
The tendency towards glib revisionism where history is concerned is arguably no more strongly 
evident than in widely espoused (though generally under-evidenced) contemporary claims that the 
global conservation effort has traditionally been driven essentially by ‘Romantic’ thinking. It is 
troublesome enough to encounter such claims in writings in the literary field,33 but more disturbing 
by far when they appear to be advanced by those whose work might impact more directly upon the 
actual application and development of conservation policy.34 Romanticism was, after all, primarily a 
literary and artistic movement rather than one driven by philosophers35 or politicians,36 and its 
principal impact upon human attitudes to nature has been manifest more in the weekend musings 
of the leisured classes than in the workaday management of the natural landscape. The latter, in 
truth, has always been driven far more strongly by the cold, controlling, mechanistic and utilitarian 
thinking associated with the earlier age of so-called reason and enlightenment, to which 
Romanticism represented no more than a lively but limited backlash.37 Thus, the traditional 
approach to ‘sustainable’ forest management has convincingly been traced back to 18th Century 
Prussia, where it was driven not by starry-eyed engrossment with all things silvestrian but by the 
urgent, ongoing demand for timber for the mining industry.38 Accordingly, any glimmers of genuine 
holistic understanding that were revealed by the original architects of this brand of conservation 
                                                          
31 Id. 
32 For an attempt to set the record straight, see MJ Bowman, ‘ “Normalizing” the International Convention for 
the Regulation of Whaling’ (2008) 29 Michigan Journal of International Law 293. 
33 Note in this vein the assertion that ‘Romanticism forms the base from which Western society, especially 
American, views its natural surroundings’: KA Mingey, New Romanticism (University of Montana Scholar 
Works, 2007), at 2. 
34 See, e.g., P Kareiva, M Marvier and R Lalasz, ‘Conservation in the Anthropocene: Beyond Solitude and 
Fragility’ (2011) <http://thebreakthrough.org/index.php/journal/past-issues/issue-2/conservation-in-the- 
anthropocene>; K Willis and C Fry, Plants: From Roots to Riches (John Murray, 2014), especially Chapter 24.  
The first and third-named authors of the former work are respectively Chief Scientist and director of science 
communications at the Nature Conservancy, an influential US pressure group which pursues a global 
environmental programme, while the first-named of the latter is Director of Science at the Royal Botanic 
Gardens at Kew, in England, which fulfils a host of important functions in connection with the UK’s national 
and international conservation commitments. 
35 Needless to say, it had its philosophical champions, amongst whom Rousseau, Goethe and Nietzsche would 
typically be numbered, though – as Richard Tarnas points out in his admirable and compendious study of 
Western thought – in Romanticism generally, and in Nietzsche in particular, the philosopher was effectively 
transformed into poet: R Tarnas, The Passion of the Western Mind (Pimlico, 1991), at 371.   
36 No doubt it had its impact on certain politicians, most notably Teddy Roosevelt in the US. It also proved 
influential in Germany, where aspects of Nazi ideology drew heavily upon Romantic thought: see, e.g., P 
Viereck, Metapolitics: From Wagner and the German Romantics to Hitler (expanded edn., Transaction 
Publishers, 2003).  
37 It has also been pointed out that over the course of time Romanticism came to embrace a powerful sense of 
alienation from nature: see Tarnas (n 35), at 376. This was, moreover, largely attributable to the extent to 
which the mechanistic, enlightenment perception of the natural world had contrived to prevail. 
38 The term Nachhaltigkeit (i.e., sustainable forest management) was coined by Hans von Carlowitz, whose 
1713 work Sylvicultura Oeconomica became the ‘bible’ in this field.  Its author was not actually a biologist, 
however, but a mining administrator desperate to maintain the supply of timber for the mines: see, e.g., JB 
Ball, ‘Global Forest Resources: History and Dynamics’ in J Evans (ed.), The Forests Handbook, Volume 1 : An 
Overview of Forest Science (Blackwell Science, 2001). 
policy were rather rapidly submerged in practice by more mundane and materialistic impulses,39 
leading ultimately to the establishment of vast arboreal monocultures that were supposedly far 
more ‘efficient’ than anything nature itself could produce, but have in reality all too often proved to 
be the graveyards both of biological diversity and of the more traditional forms of community 
benefit that can be derived from nature.40 The engineers of this particular revolution, unfortunately, 
could only see the trees for their wood.   
It would certainly present a major challenge to discern any trace of Romantic motivation behind the 
earliest legal measures regarding wildlife to be adopted at the international level, which were 
primarily concerned with conserving directly exploitable resources such as fish, fur seals and whales, 
protecting birds ‘useful to agriculture’, or countering the depredations of invasive alien species like 
Phylloxera vastatrix, the aphid scourge of European vineyards.41 Can it seriously be contended that 
those who, in the solitary preambular recital to the (now long superseded) Whaling Convention of 
1937,42 declared the conservation of whale stocks to be designed solely ‘to secure the prosperity of 
the whaling industry’ were really just a bunch of old romantics at heart? To reinforce the point, it 
might be noted that few creatures have seemed more powerfully evocative to poets, especially 
during the Romantic era, than birds of prey, which were celebrated as symbols not merely of  
freedom, but of speed, strength, visual acuity and closeness to heaven, albeit with more than a hint 
of menace.43 Yet none of this aura availed them one jot in the early wildlife treaties, for the purposes 
of which they were typically not merely excluded from protection but positively earmarked for 
persecution.44 Accordingly, when the Scottish naturalist Seton Gordon produced his 1927 paean to 
                                                          
39 On the profound impact in other regions of the resulting theory and practice of forest management, see, 
e.g., TJ Straka, ‘Evolution of Sustainability in American Forest Resource Management Planning in the Context of 
the American Forest Management Textbook’ (2009) 1 Sustainability 838; C Lang and O Pye, ‘Blinded by 
Science: The Invention of Scientific Forestry and Its Influence in the Mekong Region’ (2000-2001) 6 Watershed 
25.   
40 Lang and Pye, id.; R Ziegler, ‘Crooked Wood, Straight Timber – Kant, Development and Nature’ (2010) 2 
Public Reason 61. 
41 See generally Lyster, Chapter 1. 
42 1937 International Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling, 190 LNTS 79. 
43 The collection Lyrical Ballads (1798), which is generally regarded as having triggered the British Romantic 
movement, was inspired by the period spent by Coleridge and the Wordsworths living in Somerset, where the 
high heathland habitat of the Quantocks is noted for its birds of prey. Perhaps the best-known explicit allusion 
lies in Tennyson’s short poem ‘The Eagle’ (1851-4), though the albatross in Coleridge’s own ‘Rime of the 
Ancient Mariner’ (1798) might be considered a marine equivalent (especially since it seems that part of the 
inspiration for this epic poem was an incident in which Coleridge himself witnessed the wanton killing of a 
hawk in the course of a voyage to Malta). More generally, references to raptors abound throughout the genre, 
in Keats, Hemans and others: for details, see D Wu, Romanticism: An Anthology (4th edn., Wiley-Blackwell, 
2012), at 339-357, 1329-1336, 1370, 1397, 1429, 1439, 1457. In North America, Longfellow is said to have 
glorified the ‘unfettered self’ with ‘insistent images of birds of prey’: A. Kolodny, In Search of First Contact 
(Duke UP, 2012), at 162. 
44 See, e.g., the 1900 Convention for the Preservation of Wild Animals, Birds and Fish in Africa, 94 BFSP 715, 
Article II(13) and Table V; 1902 Convention for the Protection of Birds Useful to Agriculture, 102 BFSP 969, 
Article 9 and Schedule II. In similar fashion, the 1916 and 1936 bilateral migratory bird species treaties 
concluded by US with Canada (originally GB), 39 Stat 1702; USTS 628, and Mexico, 178 LNTS 309, respectively 
did not include any birds of prey in their lists of protected species, though some were added to the latter by 
virtue of the 1972 amendments, 23 UST 260, TIAS 7302. 
the Aquila Days with the Golden Eagle, it was considered ‘a brave book to write’, on account of ‘the 
Victorian ethos that every bird with a hooked bill should be destroyed’.45 
It would, of course, be foolish to deny the impact that Romanticism has exerted on the development 
of environmental ethics, especially  in North America, or that the Romantic ideal of communion with 
wild nature has on occasion been translated into statutory language – thus, the Act establishing 
Yellowstone National Park declared it to be ‘dedicated and set apart as a public park or pleasuring 
ground for the benefit and enjoyment of the people’ and provided for the strict control of 
exploitation of natural resources and the removal of anyone who attempted to settle there.46 Yet 
even the 80 million acres managed by the National Park Service represents only a tiny fragment of 
the total land area of the United States, and is in any event dwarfed by that controlled by the US 
Forest Service (193 million acres) and the Bureau of Land Management (248 million), both of whose 
mandates embrace sustainability, but whose focus is much more heavily upon resource 
exploitation.47 lt would therefore be gravely mistaken to assume that Romanticism had been the 
predominant motivation for conservation generally, even in the US.  Within the international legal 
order, moreover, references to aesthetic and recreational considerations did not make a prominent 
entry until the 1940s, and even then only in the Americas and as an overlay upon more narrowly 
utilitarian considerations.48 Such thinking was not really embraced by the international community 
as a whole until the adoption of the 1972 World Heritage Convention,49 though that instrument, for 
all its undoubted importance, can hardly be regarded as the centrepiece of the global conservation 
effort.50 
Furthermore, it should never be forgotten that such thinking is plainly no less anthropocentric in 
orientation than the purely materialistic reasoning that historically preceded – and comfortably 
survived – it, since both are essentially self-regarding and self-serving in character. It is simply that 
one approach attends to the needs of the body and the other to those of the spirit. The key point 
here, indeed, is to understand just how much the Romantic perspective actually shared with its 
supposedly contrasting Enlightenment predecessor:51 
                                                          
45 D Cobham, A Sparrowhawk’s Lament: How British Birds of Prey are Faring (Princeton UP, 2014), 189. 
46 Yellowstone Act, 1872 (17 Stat. 32). 
47 See RW Gorte et al., Federal Land Ownership: Overview and Data (Congressional Research Report R42346, 8 
February 2012). 
48 See the 1940 Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation in the Western Hemisphere, 161 
UNTS 193. Amongst the various types of protected area envisaged by Article 1 were not only national parks 
but ‘national reserves’ – i.e., ‘regions established for conservation and utilization of natural resources under 
government control, on which protection of animal and plant life will be afforded in so far as this may be 
consistent with the primary purposes of such reserves’.  No explicit motivation was given in Article 5, which 
addressed conservation outside protected areas, while Article 7 called for the protection of migratory birds ‘of 
economic or aesthetic value’, or to prevent outright extinction.  For further discussion, see Lyster, Chapter 8. 
49 1972 Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, (1972) UNJYB 89; 11 ILM 
1358.  The convention’s adoption marked the centenary of the establishment of Yellowstone.  For discussion, 
see Lyster, Chapter 14. 
50 This assessment stems largely from the fact that, although its substantive scope (as defined by the concept 
of natural heritage) is potentially very wide, its primary focus has always been upon listed sites, which in the 
case of natural heritage extends to fewer than 200 globally, together with around 30 of mixed natural/cultural 
significance.  
51 Tarnas (n 35), at 366.  It will be noted that in their chapter in this work, Fosci and West do not even consider 
it worthwhile to distinguish the two forms of anthropocentric justification. 
Both tended to be ‘humanist’ in their high estimate of man’s powers and their concern 
with man’s perspective on the universe.  Both looked to this world and nature as the 
setting of the human drama and the focus for human endeavour.  Both were attentive to 
the phenomena of human consciousness and the nature of its hidden structures.  Both 
found in classical culture a rich source of insight and values.  Both were profoundly 
Promethean – in their rebellion against oppressive traditional structures, in their 
celebration of individual human genius, and in their relentless quest for human freedom, 
fulfillment (sic), and bold explanation of the new. 
 
The notion that wildlife might merit protection for its own sake, entirely independently of human 
needs or interests, is a different matter altogether, being grounded in what has been described as 
nature’s intrinsic (as opposed to instrumental or inherent) value.52 This notion did not make an 
unambiguous appearance until much later, in the Council of Europe’s 1979 Bern nature conservation 
convention,53 the focus of which is essentially restricted to European wildlife,54 and the World 
Charter for Nature three years later,55 which lacks legally binding effect. It was not, in fact, until the 
entry into force of the Biodiversity Convention a little over twenty years ago that the idea can be 
seen to have taken firm root in international law generally, and even then some eminent 
commentators were casting doubt upon its practical legal significance.56   
Even though these doubts seem largely unjustified, it should be clear to everyone that the notion 
that nature has an independent, intrinsic value of its own represents merely the final, most recent 
strand in a complex skein of pluralistic justifications for conservation, the other components of 
which are much longer and more securely established. Indeed, whatever should be regarded as 
representing in principle the current philosophical underpinnings of global conservation measures, 
there are still undoubtedly some areas of human interaction with nature into which the concept of 
intrinsic value has yet to make any significant headway in practice: the most obvious instance 
concerns the realm of fisheries, and some may feel that it is unlikely to be a coincidence that it is 
here where the failure of conservation endeavours has been most profound, prolonged and 
pervasive.57 Thus, any suggestion that it is the idea of ‘protecting nature for its own sake’ that ‘has 
not worked’,58 and that we should accordingly turn to a more anthropocentric and utilitarian 
perspective, must count as one of the most muddle-headed and misconceived proposals of modern 
times.  
                                                          
52 Lyster, Chapter 3; Fosci and West, id. 
53 1979 Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats, ETS 104. 
54 While this much may seem evident from the title alone, the matter is in reality a little more complicated; for 
an explanation, see Lyster, 323-327. 
55 For the text of the instrument, together with its drafting history and commentary, see WE Burhenne and WA 
Irwin (eds.), The World Charter for Nature (2nd rev edn., Erich Schmidt Verlag, 1986). 
56 See, e.g., PW Birnie, AE Boyle and CJ Redgwell, International Law & the Environment (3rd edn., OUP, 2009), at 
618. 
57 For recent assessments, see Lyster, Chapter 5, Part 6; R Barnes, ‘Fisheries and Marine Biodiversity’ in M 
Fitzmaurice, DM Ong and P Merkouris (eds.), Research Handbook on International Environmental Law (Edward 
Elgar, 2010); P Sands and J Peel, Principles of International Environmental Law (3rd edn., CUP, 2012), Chapter 9, 
especially 447-448.  McLellan, Parry-Jones et al. (n 24), note that the scale of illegal fishing amounts to almost 
20% of the total global catch, and is worth around 10 billion euros per year. 
58 Kareiva et al. (n 34). 
 Indeed, far too many of the more trenchant criticisms of existing treaties and strident calls for 
‘reform’ – and especially those which tout the merits of so-called ‘economic’ solutions – seem 
ultimately to be grounded in the desire to advance the personal emotional and ideological 
preoccupations of their authors rather than conservation objectives as such, and tend for that 
reason to overlook or misrepresent crucial aspects of the contemporary legal regime and the way in 
which it came to be as it is.59 While such solutions may undoubtedly have a place in the overall 
scheme of things, any attempt to present them as a universal panacea needs to be resisted and 
recognised for what it is – namely the product of a very singular perspective on human affairs, and 
one which has repeatedly failed to deliver the benefits it has so loudly and fervently promised.60   
These failures, of course, extend far beyond the field of conservation itself to permeate every aspect 
of human affairs: thus, by the turn of the millennium, economists of the dominant neo-classical 
school had become so intoxicated by their own insistence that deregulated, market-driven policies 
would make the familiar boom-and-bust cycle of the global economy a thing of the past that none of 
them actually foresaw the all-too-obviously impending crash of 2008, the formal prediction of which 
was left to the few remaining mavericks within the discipline.61 The susceptibility of the majority 
within this profession to becoming so easily blinded by the limitations of their own, still regrettably 
dismal, science62 plainly offers an important lesson regarding the nature of vision in this context, 
which is that where it is only of the ‘tunnel’ variety it will all too readily become an encouragement 
towards detachment from reality, the engine for self-serving revisionism and the enemy of 
perspicacity of the genuine kind.63 Accordingly, it is necessary to be alert to the risk that, while the 
adoption of a ‘vision’ may help to give purpose and direction to any particular project, this must 
always be balanced against the countervailing risk that it may merely constitute the formal 
enshrinement of particular prejudices and preconceptions, and on that account an active 
impediment to progress of a genuine kind, perhaps even precipitating the ultimate derailment of the 
entire enterprise.  
Seemingly the latest in this long line of ‘visionary’ distractions entails the declaration of a putatively 
new geological era, the ‘Anthropocene’, in which we finally force ourselves to acknowledge the ‘fast, 
deep and long-lasting effects that humans have on the planet’ and indeed that we have now become 
‘the dominant force of change on Earth’. We must, it seems, recognise that ‘humans are not an 
outside force perturbing an otherwise natural system but rather an integral and interacting part of 
the Earth system itself’. Accordingly, we ‘need to start adjusting our lifestyles to nature – and then to 
                                                          
59 For discussion of this problem in relation to CITES, for example, see Bowman (n 30). 
60 For a helpful recent exploration of these issues, see A Wiersema, ‘Uncertainty and Markets for Endangered 
Species under CITES’ (2013) 22 RECIEL 239-250. 
61 See S Keen, Debunking Economics: The Naked Emperor Dethroned (rev edn., Zed Books, 2011).  For a variety 
of other valuable perspectives upon this sorry saga, see GA Akerlof and RJ Shiller, Animal Spirits (rev edn., 
Princeton UP, 2010); G Tett, Fool’s Gold (Abacus, 2010); Ha-Joon Chang, 23 Things They Don’t Tell You About 
Capitalism (Penguin, 2011); R Layard, Happiness (2nd rev edn., Penguin, 2011).  
62 Chang, id., has recently suggested in an interview that his discipline currently has more in keeping with 
science fiction than with genuine science: see M Reisz, ‘Believing the Unbelievable: Where Adam Smith and 
Agent Smith Meet’ Times Higher Education (London) 26 March 2015. 
63 For the latest example of recognition by a financial system insider of the damagingly ‘blinkered’ nature of 
modern economics, see ‘Sackcloth and Ashes on Threadneedle Street’, an interview with Bank of England 
research chief Andy Haldane, New Scientist (London) 28 March 2015, 28-29. 
turn our human systems into nature’.64 Yet while there is not much of substance to quarrel with 
here, there is surely also decidedly little by way of novelty, since one could find an exposition of 
almost exactly the same set of ideas from the preamble to the Stockholm Declaration on the Human 
Environment,65 concluded over 40 years ago!   
Perhaps this propensity towards reinvention of the rhetorical wheel should simply be taken as 
confirmation of a strongly cyclical tendency within human affairs generally: it might even, indeed, 
represent something to celebrate, if only there were evidence that this latest upsurge of visionary 
zeal were to have resulted in the creation of a more effective rallying cry for contemporary 
conservation efforts. Unfortunately, however, the evidence is rather to the contrary. Indeed, the 
new slogan, as even its latest champion is forced to concede, suffers from the all too obvious 
weakness that it has already been misinterpreted as a reaffirmation of ‘our right to rule the natural 
world for narrow human interests’,66 the very opposite of what was actually intended and what is 
now so clearly and urgently required. Yet surely it should not have taken much imagination to realise 
that any attempt to declare the onset of the ‘Anthropocene’ would be interpreted simply as a call 
for yet more anthropocentrism, especially when works published by way of advocacy of this idea are 
disseminated under the headline ‘Time to Play God’.67  
More worryingly still, these arguments display the all-too-familiar tendency to create a largely 
imagined historical and operational narrative to demonstrate (or inflate) the importance of the 
supposed new perspective. Thus, on the basis of a visit to a meeting of the CBD CoP in Nagoya, 
where the question of protected areas was discussed, the author of the piece in question interprets 
the existing global conservation regime as being based upon a desire to protect only nature which is 
‘pristine’ and ‘untouched’, and believed on that account to be ‘real’. Yet, however important the 
maintenance of nature reserves might be, he intones, this will not of itself be enough, as in the new 
era we will need to recognise, protect and even reconstruct nature everywhere if we are ultimately 
to flourish or even survive.68  It seems somehow to have escaped his attention that the Convention 
on Biological Diversity from the outset established as its primary objective the conservation of 
biological diversity generally, whether wild or domesticated, and wherever it might be found; 
furthermore, as the substantive provisions explicitly confirm, this must necessarily include all the 
areas beyond nature reserves and even involve purely man-made facilities created specifically for 
the purpose.69 Indeed, some twenty years before the CBD’s adoption, the Ramsar Convention had 
introduced a system of protection for all wetland types, whether natural or man-made, and without 
regard to whether or not they had formally been accorded the status of a nature reserve in national 
law.70 Accordingly, it enshrined as its guiding mantra the principle of ‘wise use’, deliberately 
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66 Schwägerl (n 64). 
67 Though it should, perhaps, be acknowledged that the author himself may possibly have had no personal 
involvement in the choice of this title. 
68 Schwägerl (n 64). 
69 Note in particular Articles 8(c),(d),(e),(f),(h),(i),(j),(k),(l), 9. 
70 Note in particular the implications of Articles 3 and 4. 
eschewing any policy that might be described as ‘hands-off’.71 Several decades even before that, 
moreover, the Western Hemisphere Convention, while  calling for the establishment of a graduated 
network of conservation areas – from those exhibiting strict wilderness values to those seen 
primarily as reserves set aside for resource exploitation – had in fact sought to protect and preserve 
wildlife both within and beyond them.72 
 
2.2 Vision and Virtue in Legal Scholarship 
In the light of the recurrent tendency amongst commentators to lose touch with historical reality in 
the course of these ‘visionary’ outpourings, it is surely to be regarded as one of the key virtues of 
Lyster’s monograph when it originally appeared in the mid-1980s that it seemed so resolute in its 
determination to resist all temptations towards tub- or table-thumping,73 and the drift into 
speculative, idiosyncratic or fanciful prescriptions for future action, to which this subject-matter so 
readily lends itself. Instead, the author’s principal aim was to focus on providing a suitably detailed 
account of the workings of the international legal machinery of conservation that would 
simultaneously be lively, cogent and succinct, and yet at the same time scholarly, sober and 
restrained, and might through the exhibition of these qualities ultimately emerge as both engaging 
and authoritative. Through his success in capturing these virtues, he was able to lay the intellectual 
foundations for the development of a viable new jurisprudence of international nature conservation, 
which had been sadly lacking up to that point. There had, admittedly, previously been isolated works 
which addressed selected aspects of the subject, but seemingly nothing which could be regarded as 
having addressed the full range of its subject-matter and drawn together the various strands into a 
coherent whole,74 through the identification of the key legal principles, practices and procedures 
that permeated this fast expanding area of the law, as applied systematically in relation to each of 
the key modern treaties that populated the field.  It was, indeed, really only from that point on that 
international wildlife law could lay credible claims to becoming a meaningful discipline at all, as 
commentators began to treat his work as a kind of intellectual base-camp for the serious and 
scholarly exploration of the many more specialised nooks and crannies of the subject-matter.75 It 
was, moreover, not merely out of deference to Lyster personally, but precisely because his basic 
approach was thought still to have so very much to commend it, that it was so readily embraced by 
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the authors of the second edition.76 In that sense, therefore, the aim was very much to preserve the 
‘vision’ of calm, coherent and conscientious analysis by which the original work was inspired.  
Insofar as any attempt was made to modify this general approach in the new edition, it was only to 
the extent of seeking to contextualise the subject-matter a little more fully, through the insertion of 
entirely new sections at either end of the work. The introductory suite of chapters sought specifically 
to explain in greater depth and detail the historical development and philosophical underpinnings of 
international wildlife law, as well as its place in the wider global legal order. As to the former 
aspects, their critical importance to the development of a coherent picture of wildlife conservation 
has already been addressed in the discussion above, as indeed has the extent to which they have 
proved a fertile breeding ground for misapprehension and misrepresentation. As regards the latter, 
a key point is that many, and perhaps even the majority, of those who require to acquaint 
themselves with the operations of the major wildlife treaty regimes are likely to approach the 
subject from a position of relative unfamiliarity with the intricacies of the international legal system 
as such: their own background and expertise may lie, for example, in the realms of science or policy, 
or in the purely national dimension of conservation law. Accordingly, it was judged desirable to 
provide a brief overview of this broader legal backcloth, if only as a means of highlighting certain of 
its crucial aspects and directing readers to some of the more valuable sources of information about 
them. It may be, indeed, that it is not only the uninitiated who may benefit from a degree of 
exposure to  such matters, since even those who can lay claims to genuine expertise in this area may 
fall victim to perceptual shortfall on occasion. The point is particularly pertinent with regard to the 
review essay under discussion, for there are grounds for suggesting that the perspective of its author 
with regard to the existing realities of the international legal order seem a little blinkered or blurry 
here and there, even with regard to certain matters of a fairly fundamental kind. 
 
3.  Perceptions of the Global Constitutional Order 
Any attempt to explore the workings of the international legal system must begin with the 
recognition that it is scarcely possible to conceive of a legal order without reference to the particular 
polity, or political community, to which it relates – legal norms must, after all, be created by 
someone, and with a view to regulation of the conduct of certain specified actors, as well as being 
motivated by certain needs or interests which they are intended to protect. In many cases, of 
course, they are designed to reconcile perceived conflicts of interest within the community in 
question, or to coax its members towards unified or at least harmonised approaches towards 
significant problems. It is in that specific respect that certain of the comments made by Professor 
Wandesforde-Smith appear particularly problematic. Citing a passage from the original 1985 edition 
of International Wildlife Law,77 he asserts that it 
is no longer useful ... to speak of an international community as the chief source of 
pressure on States to protect wildlife and to see to it that there is ‘somebody in 
government ... doing something every working day’ to make wildlife law and to make it 
effective.  The idea of ‘an international community’ long ago fractured and multiplied 
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77 Wandesforde-Smith (n 11), at 85, citing Lyster (n 10), at 181. 
into a profusion of international actors, the current number and variety of which far 
exceed anything Lyster had experienced when he put together his book.  
 
He proposes instead that the expression be replaced by the term ‘international environmental 
movement’, which, he suggests, ‘implicates a far more complex reality’.78 It is, however, not at all 
easy to see how that could possibly be so, since it is surely more plausible to suppose that it is the 
entire political community within which international law is operative which represents the broader 
and more complex reality, of which ‘the international environmental movement’ (however that 
might be interpreted) is merely one element, functioning alongside the many other comparable 
movements devoted to alternative objectives, such as peace, disarmament, human rights, free 
trade, economic development and so on.    
 
3.1 Reflections on the Nature of ‘Community’ 
The passage in question also implies that it is somehow inconsistent with the essential nature of a 
‘community’ for it to be ‘fractured and multiplied into a profusion of actors’, but it is again difficult 
to understand the basis for any such assumption. Assuredly, the expression ‘community’, like its 
Latin counterpart communitas, is often used to convey some notion of shared purpose, conviction or 
‘agreement’,79 but there can be no justification for insistence upon that interpretation exclusively, 
since it is best seen as only a secondary application of the word, rather than reflecting the 
irreducible core of its meaning.80 Indeed, the attribution to the word ‘community’ of a strong or 
reinforced sense of ‘oneness’ may possibly derive from the misconception that its Latin precursor 
represented a compound of the prepositional prefix com- (signifying ‘with’, or ‘together’) with the 
abstract noun unitas (unity). The true derivation of the word communitas (and hence the original 
thrust of the sense of sharing that it conveys) is, however, entirely different and altogether more 
subtle, since the word in reality represents a compound of com- with the plural noun form munia, 
alternatively rendered as moenia, a word conventionally deployed in the former spelling to signify 
public duties or functions and, in the latter, the walls or fortifications of a city.81  Oddly, these two 
ostensibly very different meanings may well be mere semantic variants of the same basic idea, the 
verb moenio or munio meaning to build, prepare or make provision.82 
While it therefore cannot be excluded that it was some sense of the need for, or the emergence of, 
public functions which originally underpinned the concept of ‘community’, the idea which tends 
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79 See C Schwarz et al. (eds.), Chambers English Dictionary (1988); DP Simpson (ed.), Cassell’s New Latin 
Dictionary (5th edn., 1968).  Certainly the etymologically related word ‘common’ tends to be applied in that 
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81 See Simpson (n 79). Also connected is munus, meaning some gift or service offered out of duty. 
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meant to surround with fortifications. 
more commonly to be emphasised in classical etymological references is that of co-location or 
confinement within defined boundaries.83 Although the walls of a city represent a convenient 
paradigm here, the natural linguistic drift towards figurative usage inevitably results in the 
application of the same term regardless of whether the boundaries in question are actually man-
made or even assume physical form at all. Accordingly, other commonly encountered English 
definitions include simply ‘the public in general’ and ‘a body of persons in the same locality’.84   If this 
group is of any size (and especially if it persists for any length of time) it seems almost inevitable that 
it will come to include numerous different sub-groups, factions and alignments within it.   
In this vein, it is noteworthy that within the specialised lexicon of the life sciences, the term 
‘community’ is used simply to indicate a group of wildlife populations that inhabit the same area, 
and engage in interaction with each other.85 Since these will inevitably include both predators and 
prey, any presumption of unity of purpose or perspective seems implausible to say the least. 
Instead, an ecological community must be viewed as a variety of complex system, an ‘assemblage of 
organisms bound into a functional whole by their mutual relationships’.86  Within this system, a kind 
of homeodynamic balance is preserved not by unity of purpose but by the richness and diversity of 
these interactions, which continuously recycle energy within the system and thereby forestall the 
drift into ultimate stillness, sterility and extinction of order that would otherwise represent the 
inevitable consequence of the operation of the second law of thermodynamics.87 
That is not to suggest, of course, that the idea of community necessarily excludes the possibility of 
unity of purpose or perspective, since it will always remain possible, certainly in the human case, to 
create a physical, social or institutional enclave for the specific purpose of attracting a congregation 
of the like-minded, as for example in the case of a sports club, pressure group or religious retreat. It 
is also clear that the term has sometimes been explicitly employed in precisely that sense in 
international law, as in the case of the European Communities, ECOWAS or CARICOM.88 Yet history 
suggests that even in cases such as these the task of maintaining the proclaimed state of unified 
purpose, let alone building effectively upon it, will prove challenging in the extreme. Nor will the 
deployment of some alternative label, such as ‘union’, to describe the organisation in question 
necessarily have the effect of enhancing the sense of motivational cohesion, for all its pretentions in 
that direction.89 Furthermore, in what must surely be regarded as the more typical case of a political 
community, there will be no antecedent universal purpose at all, since the polity in question will only 
have come about in the first place as the result of mere historical happenstance rather than through 
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84 Schwartz (n 79). 
85 An ecosystem is commonly defined to comprise this biological community, taken together with the physical 
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Sciences (OUP, 1990); C Park, Oxford Dictionary of Environment and Conservation (OUP, 2008). 
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an exercise of conscious planning on anyone’s part. Undoubtedly, the chances of achieving a 
tolerable modus vivendi within the group as a whole are sure to be increased if all the various 
individuals and factions of which it is composed can somehow work their way towards achieving a 
shared sense of purpose and policy with regard to certain crucial questions; such concordance is, 
however, essentially a political aspiration of the community in question rather than a constitutional 
precondition.   
Where reference is made, moreover, to ‘the international community’ in a general political sense, it 
is clear that we are speaking of a polity of this latter kind, since it has come into being over the 
course of time simply as a casual by-product of the progressive intensification, diversification and 
globalisation of human affairs.  It is also a highly complex, multi-faceted and pluri-dimensional entity, 
since the jumble of interlocking constituencies of which it is composed may validly be described and 
defined by reference to a multitude of highly diverse criteria, including those of a geo-political, 
ethnic, linguistic, socio-cultural, religious, ideological, occupational, recreational or even purely 
functional kind.90 Whereas the multifarious activities associated with these different constituencies 
might once have been conducted predominantly within local or national boundaries, that has long 
since ceased to be the case, and the only encircling rampart or ‘earthwork’ by which they are now 
effectively contained is that represented by the planetary boundary itself.91 That is certainly the 
reality in the case of the ‘international environmental movement’, and is no less true of the many 
other comparable constituencies mentioned above. 
 
3.2 The International Community and the Environment   
In the light of these considerations, the real challenge here, it might be suggested, is in the first 
instance to ensure that the voice of the environmental movement is not drowned out by the 
cacophony of claims that continuously emanate from these various other factions, as part of the 
ongoing process of competitive clamour that is played out amongst them. More ambitiously, 
however, and in the longer term, the aim must be to ensure that its message is actually absorbed 
into and effectively integrated with their own, in the sense that full and proper allowance is made 
for the basic principles of biodiversity conservation in the governance of operations that occur 
within and across the fields of economic development, international trade and finance, human 
rights, armed conflict and so on. In point of fact, this process is already under way, since formal 
recognition has long been accorded to conservation needs (if only, in some cases, in the form of lip 
service) in the formulation of the substantive legal norms by which these various areas of human 
endeavour are governed, above all through the principle of sustainable development.92 What is now 
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91 Certain activities, of course, such as space travel, transcend even that limitation. 
92 Thus, the preamble to the 1994 Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation, 1867 UNTS 3, 
reaffirms its goal of expanding trade and allowing for the optimal use of resources ‘in accordance with the 
required is that this allowance be transformed into full and effective implementation and 
endorsement at every level and on a systematic basis.   
A significant spur to this process is provided by the explicit recognition of the need to reduce 
biodiversity loss as a key element in achieving environmental sustainability,93 which was one of the 
eight Millennium Development Goals agreed by the UN in 2002.94 It would seem that, where the 
environment is concerned, the practical dictates of living within a community in the original sense of 
the word may eventually give rise to the recognition of a community of interest in the extended, 
Wandesfordian, sense (i.e. commonality), for the simple reason that the earth’s fundamental life 
support systems, although robust, are not endlessly resistant to unconstrained abuse, and collective 
action will therefore be necessary to preserve them. Accordingly, although the ‘pressure on States to 
protect wildlife’ may originally have emanated from what might be referred to as the ‘international 
environmental movement’, those particular cudgels would now seem to have been taken up, if only 
somewhat tentatively as yet, by the wider political community as a whole. 
It is also important not to overlook the fact that this trend has been reflected in a series of highly 
significant individual initiatives from a wide variety of different sources. Wandesforde-Smith himself 
identifies ‘the United States, the European Union, Canada, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand’ 
as entities that have ‘over recent decades ... for one reason or another and in some policy areas 
more than another in each case, shown exceptional leadership’ in the conservation field.95 Yet it 
might be questioned whether he has been sufficiently alert here to avoid falling into the ‘invidious 
distinctions’ which he himself specifically cautions against,96 resulting in a somewhat parochial 
assessment. For while the entities he highlights do indeed have certain significant achievements to 
their name, there are some vital policy areas – climate change for one – in which a number of them 
could as justifiably be assigned the label of laggard as that of leader. In addition, assessments of 
achievement in this field must surely depend to some extent upon what particular nations can 
feasibly afford, and it might on that account be questioned whether all of those entities mentioned 
could not, in the light of their affluence, reasonably have contributed significantly more than they 
actually have.   
The Biodiversity Convention itself sees the transfer of resources from the richer nations as being 
critical to conservation success,97 and Wandesforde-Smith interprets this as a movement ‘from 
places where wildlife protection is highly valued to places where it is less so’.98  Others, however, 
may see the matter as turning more on the relative ability of different states to fund the measures 
which they might ideally deem desirable, and on that account, for instance, to judge Kenya’s 
decision in 1989 to destroy its ivory stockpile and forgo the considerable income it might have 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance 
the means for doing so’.  Note also the 2000 Cotonou Partnership Agreement between ACP and EC States, 
(2000) OJEC L317/3, especially Articles 1, 9, 32. 
93 Target 7.B, Goal 7. 
94 See generally the dedicated website at <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/>.  Discussions are currently 
under way within the UN regarding a set of revised goals to govern the process of sustainable development.  
95 Wandesforde-Smith (n 11), at 89, footnote 31. 
96 Id. 
97 This concern is in fact pervasive throughout the Convention, but see especially Article 20(4). 
98 Wandesforde-Smith (n 11), at 91. 
earned from it as indicative of very substantial conservation commitment.99 It might equally be 
recalled, again simply by way of example, that it was the government of India that, through repeated 
promptings, secured formal recognition (albeit in rather equivocal terms) of the legitimate interests 
of other life-forms at the Stockholm Conference,100 Zaire (as it then was) that spearheaded the 
project leading to the adoption of the Word Charter for Nature ten years later,101 Costa Rica that has 
designated over 25% of its land mass as protected areas102 and Bolivia that triggered the current UN 
programme concerning elaboration of the idea of harmony with nature. 103  Conservation 
commitment of sorts can actually be found right across the international community, but is seldom 
as robust or consistent anywhere as might be judged ideal. 
 
3.3 Legal Implications of Community Commitment 
In addition, there are other, more subtle and specifically legal, senses in which it is appropriate to 
attribute the source of pressure for biodiversity conservation, however it is specifically manifest, to 
the international community as a whole rather than to some particular faction within it. This 
assignment of substantive sponsorship is in fact appropriate whenever a particular conservation 
programme becomes enshrined in legal form at the transnational level, since, once that process has 
been completed through the creation and assumption of appropriate legal undertakings, a new 
consortium of underwriters is automatically brought into the picture.  This occurs for the simple 
reason that the more fundamental commitment to legal commitment as such – i.e., to the rule of 
law in international affairs – is not only dependent upon, but actually commands (in repeatedly 
reaffirmed fashion) the support of the entire community, and not just the environmental faction 
within it.104 Indeed, within this broader polity, there would seem to be no politically significant 
entity, agency or constituency (however defined or described) that seeks positively to deny, at least 
as a matter of abstract principle, the validity and importance of such commitment.   
Accordingly, once any particular legal obligation is formally created in the environmental (or indeed 
in any other) field, it automatically attracts the support of the pre-existing and collectively endorsed 
constitutional infrastructure comprising the principles of state responsibility and, wherever the duty 
in question is couched in treaty form, the law of treaties. As a result, certain forensic opportunities 
for securing adherence to the commitment in question potentially become available. These possible 
sources of redress are, of course, overlaid upon whatever inducements to performance – whether in 
the form of carrots or sticks – may be available under specific MEA regimes themselves. Thus, in the 
                                                          
99 For discussion of this incident, see R Leakey and V Morell, Wildlife Wars (St Martin’s Press, 2001).  Since that 
time, various other states have of course followed that example, most recently Ethiopia, as to which, see 
<http://www.bbc.uk/news/world-africa-31983727>  
100 See LB Sohn, ‘The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment’ (1973) 14 Harvard International Law 
Journal 423, at 459. 
101 See further Burhenne and Irwin (n 55). 
102 C Runyan, ‘Forever Costa Rica’ Nature Conservancy Magazine (Arlington, VA) June 2011.  
103 See the dedicated UN website at <http://www.harmonywithnatureun.org/> 
104 The point is made, for example, both in the first recital of the preamble to the UN Charter, and in its first 
substantive provision.  It is dealt with more substantively in UNGA Resolution 2625 (XXV), the 1970 Declaration 
on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations.  See further UNGA Resolution A/RES/44/23, of 17 November 1989, on 
the United Nations Decade for International Law. 
recent Antarctic Whaling case,105 the International Court of Justice made it clear that its decision 
should not be understood as an attempt to align itself with any of the sharply divergent perspectives 
on the environmental, scientific or ethical issues involved in the conduct of whaling, but only as an 
application of the general rules governing the implementation and interpretation of treaties,106 
which, as suggested above, can for most practical purposes be regarded as having received the 
endorsement of the international community as a whole.107    
This process of collective underwriting is, moreover, significantly intensified whenever the 
substantive commitment in question is recognised as being grounded not merely in the particular 
interests of individual states, but in the shared interests of a certain group, or indeed of the 
community as a whole. In this vein, the 1946 Whaling Convention (ICRW), which was the treaty in 
issue in the Whaling case, explicitly recognised ‘the interest of the nations of the world’ in 
safeguarding whale stocks,108 and accordingly permitted participation in the regime by any state, 
whether personally engaged in whaling or not.109 In the modern context, the collective nature of the 
interest in the performance of conservation commitments might arguably be assumed even in the 
absence of express confirmation by the individual treaty in question, since it would seem that the 
conservation of biological diversity has been authoritatively declared to represent the ‘common 
concern of humankind’ as a matter of general principle.110   
This recognition has served only to bolster certain ideas of community interest that are already 
evident within the law of state responsibility,111 and bear upon the ease with which it may be 
invoked against a delinquent state. Specifically, a breach of duty may be challenged (i) in a 
representative capacity, by any state to whom the duty is owed,112 or (ii) in the more specific 
capacity of ‘injured state’, by any party within that group which is specially affected, or where the 
position of all group members with respect to further performance is radically transformed.113 In 
either case, the state in question may demand cessation of the wrongful act and performance of the 
obligation of reparation.114 The implications of these provisions are therefore such as to create 
considerable opportunities for any individual state with a sufficiently strong commitment to appoint 
itself as a guardian of conservation or other community interests on an ad hoc basis. Thus, in the 
light of their recent application by the ICJ to a treaty concerning accountability for torture in the case 
                                                          
105 Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v Japan; New Zealand intervening), Judgment of 31 March 2014, ICJ. 
106 See in particular paragraph 69 of the Judgment. 
107 The substantive principles embodied in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331, 
are widely understood to represent contemporary customary international law (whether through codification 
or progressive development) and regularly applied as such, and largely regardless of whether the states in 
question have formally become parties to it. 
108 1946 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, 161 UNTS 72, first preambular recital. 
109 Article X(2). 
110 CBD, preamble, third recital. For further consideration of this notion, and of its legal implications, see the 
chapter by Duncan French is this volume. Note also the affirmation, twenty years earlier, in the World Heritage 
Convention (n 49) that ‘it is incumbent on the international community as a whole to participate in the 
protection of the ... natural heritage of outstanding universal value’: preamble, seventh recital. 
111 As to which, see the 2001 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, formulated 
by the International Law Commission and available via its website at <http://www.un.org/law/ilc/> or from its 
Report of the 53rd Session, ILC (2001), GAOR 56th Session, Supp. 10. 
112 Id., Article 48. 
113 Id., Article 42. 
114 The key distinction is that only an injured state may demand reparation in its own interest; others may do 
so solely in the interest of the injured state or other beneficiaries of the obligation breached: Article 48(2)(b). 
between Belgium and Senegal regarding the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite,115 Japan did not 
even consider it worthwhile challenging Australia’s legal standing to complain of a breach of the 
ICRW by Japan in the Whaling case itself.  
A further significant aspect of the case for present purposes concerned the decision by New Zealand 
to intervene in the proceedings in order to make representations regarding the proper 
interpretation of the Whaling Convention, as all contracting parties to a multilateral treaty which is 
in issue in proceedings before the ICJ are entitled to do.116 In the course of a very fully elaborated 
opinion on the matter,117 the Brazilian member of the Court, Judge Cançado Trindade, recognised 
this right as a vital means of diluting the heavy ‘bilateralist bias that permeates dispute settlement 
under the procedure aspect of this Court’,118 a transformation which was essential where the 
dispute related to ‘domains of concern to the international community as a whole’.119  There was no 
doubt that the present case fell into that category, since 
The general policy objectives under the ICRW were ...  – and remain – the protection of 
all whale species from overfishing, to the benefit of future generations in all nations, and 
the orderly development of the whaling industry was to abide by that.120 
 
He further emphasised the fact that the preambular reference to the whaling industry was 
expressed in terms of its orderly development rather than its development as such, indicating that 
its activities in the future were to be constrained by the collective interest in preserving the good 
order of the oceans through the adoption of proper mechanisms of conservation and the avoidance 
of conflicts or disputes, the ‘mere profitability’ of the industry having been discarded as an 
objective.121 He duly concluded by hailing the ‘resurrection’ of the right of intervention in recent 
years as a most welcome development, 
propitiating the sound administration of justice ..., attentive to the needs not only of all 
states concerned but of the international community as a whole, in the conceptual 
universe of the jus gentium of our times.122  
                                                          
115 (2012) ICJ Reports 422.  The treaty in question was the 1984 UN Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment, UN Doc A/Res/39/46; (1985) 23 ILM 1027, (1986) 24 
ILM 535.  Having determined Belgium’s entitlement to institute proceedings simply by virtue of its 
participation in the treaty, the Court found it unnecessary to consider its further, more specific, claim to be an 
‘injured state’: see especially Part III of its judgment, paras. 64-70.   
116 See Article 63, Statute of the International Court of Justice.  Note also Article 62, which provides that any 
state which considers that it has an interest of a legal nature which may be affected by a decision to request to 
be permitted to intervene. 
117 The opinion may be located via the ‘Incidental Proceedings’ link in the entry for this case on the Court’s 
website. 
118 See para. 71 of his Separate Opinion on the Declaration of Intervention.  
119 Para. 66, id. 
120 Para. 60, id. (emphasis added). 
121 Para. 58, id. This should not, of course, be understood to imply that the prosperity of the industry was now 
to be regarded as entirely irrelevant: rather, it was effectively demoted from the status of an (indeed, the sole) 
objective, as it had been in the earlier 1937 Convention, to merely one factor to be taken into account in the 
fixing of quotas by the IWC: see Article V and especially para (2)(d) of the ICRW.  These arguments had all been 
explored at much greater length in Bowman (n 32), which was cited by Judge Cançado Trindade in paragraph 
71 of his further individual opinion delivered at the merits stage of the case. 
122 Para. 68, Individual Opinion regarding Intervention. 
 In the light of these considerations, now would seem to be the least appropriate time imaginable to 
abandon commitment to the notion of the ‘international community’ as the underlying guarantor of 
conservation commitments and to reduce the project to the private fief of some ill-defined faction 
called the ‘international environmental movement’: however the matter may appear when viewed 
through the prism of political science, there can be no doubt of the continuing (and indeed growing) 
importance of community commitment to conservation from a strictly legal perspective. In this 
context, it is at last arguably appropriate to assert that we are all environmentalists now, at least in 
principle. Indeed, since the most fundamental objective of the international law of conservation is 
essentially to preserve the life support systems of the planet, it is difficult to see what rational 
grounds could exist for any particular constituency to seek to exempt itself from the project.123 
At this juncture, however, it might well be objected that it is only in the very rare event of a dispute 
regarding the application or interpretation of a conservation treaty coming before an adjudicative 
body such as the ICJ that such a degree of attention is likely to be focused upon the precise nature 
and content of the legal commitments entailed, and that it would therefore be unwise to set too 
much store by any pronouncements that are generated in the process, especially since they will only 
produce binding effects for those states that were directly involved in the litigation process itself.124 
There is no doubt some force in this point,125 but there are also a number of countervailing 
considerations that should be borne in mind.   
The first of these is that, whatever the formal limitations of the applicability of judicial decisions, in 
the modern context the echoes of any such judgment are sure to be heard far beyond the confines 
of the courtroom itself: it is difficult to believe, for example, that any IWC member that was minded 
to issue permits for scientific whaling would henceforth feel able to disregard altogether the 
considerations spelled out by the ICJ with regard to the interpretation in good faith of the relevant 
provision of the ICRW, Article 8.126  Indeed, New Zealand has already secured the adoption of a 
resolution at the most recent meeting of the IWC which was broadly designed to give effect to the 
key legal pronouncements of the Court.127  Furthermore, the mere fact that issues concerning the 
conservation of biological diversity are now thought sufficiently important to generate litigation 
before the World Court serves of itself to heighten the profile of this area of policy concern in a 
more general way.  
                                                          
123 Needless to say, this does not exclude the possibility that a host of imperfectly rational or blatantly 
irrational reasons may be raised in relation to particular projects or situations. 
124 That is to say, the actual parties to the litigation themselves, together with any state that opts to intervene 
in the case on the grounds that it is a party to a convention which is in issue: ICJ Statute, Articles 59, 63.   
125 It seems, for example, that states other than Great Britain and the US that were involved in the exploitation 
of fur seals felt little compunction in ignoring the implications of the arbitral decision in the Bering Sea Fur 
Seals case, (1898) 1 Moore’s International Arbitration Awards 755: see generally S Barrett, Environment and 
Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty- Making (OUP, 2005), Chapter 2. 
126 Japan itself has already submitted a revised proposal which was intended to be compliant: see the Circular 
IWC.ALL.220 of 19 November 2014, ‘Government of Japan: New Scientific Whale Research Program in the 
Antarctic Ocean’, available on the IWC website at <http://iwc.int/circulars>. 
127 Resolution 2014-5, on Whaling under Special Permit.  It must be conceded that this resolution was 
ultimately adopted only by 35 votes to 20, with five abstentions.  It should also be recognised, however, that 
its failure to secure universal endorsement may well be attributable to the fact that, as observed by various 
states and accepted by NZ, it went beyond the strict terms of the judgment in certain respects.   
Secondly, and in reinforcement of the previous point, all the signs are that the incidence of such 
litigation is only likely to intensify in the future,128 especially bearing in mind that the ICJ does not 
stand alone here, in the sense that the roll-call of judicial, quasi-judicial and arbitral tribunals 
available to process cases grounded upon the international responsibility of states in an 
environmental context has significantly increased of late.129 Recent years have even witnessed the 
establishment by the Security Council of a wholly new institution designed to address on a purely ad 
hoc basis the legal consequences of the illegal Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, a development which 
has generated, inter alia, a mass of valuable precedents concerning the definition and valuation of 
environmental harm.130  
In addition, the undeniable residual reluctance of states to institute international legal proceedings 
on their own behalf in respect of environmental harm may sometimes be circumvented by the 
recruitment or intervention of other agencies. In the case of the long-running saga concerning the 
Greek government’s failure to fulfil its obligations under the Bern Convention with regard to the 
protection of turtle nesting sites at Laganas Bay, Zakynthos, for example, the nascent proposal by a 
small consortium of states to institute arbitration proceedings against Greece under the terms of 
Article 18 of that treaty was ultimately abandoned only in light of the willingness of the European 
Commission to institute proceedings for breach of the EU Habitats Directive – an option which also 
permitted access to the stronger remedies and enforcement mechanisms of EU Law.131   
In other instances, the route to enforcement may be rather less direct and obvious.  The government 
of Tanzania, for example, may possibly have anticipated the criticism to which it was subjected 
within the World Heritage Committee in 2010 on account of its proposal to develop an all-weather, 
bitumenised trunk road across the Serengeti National Park, since this was designed largely to 
stimulate economic growth in the surrounding regions and threatened significant harm to the park 
itself, a World Heritage site.132 It may have been more surprised, however, to find itself subsequently 
instructed by the East African Court of Justice to abandon the project in its original form, as a result 
of proceedings instituted by an African animal welfare organisation.133  Yet this decision was 
squarely based upon provisions of the East African Community Treaty which required partner states 
to co-ordinate their economic and other policies to the extent necessary to achieve Community 
objectives, and to promote the sustainable utilization of their natural resources and the taking of 
                                                          
128 Note in this regard the consolidated cases currently pending before the ICJ between Costa Rica and 
Nicaragua, where each complains of a violation of the Ramsar Wetlands Convention. 
129 In addition to the forums noted in the text below, ITLOS represents a notable example. 
130 For details, see the website of the UNCC at <http://www.uncc.ch>  
131 For discussion, see Lyster, 342-344.  
132 See World Heritage Committee Decision 35 COM 7B.5, which envisaged the possibility of irreversible 
damage to the property’s outstanding universal value in the absence of a suitable environmental impact 
assessment.  See further Decision 36 COM 7B.6 of 2011, in which the Committee welcomed Tanzania’s 
decision in response to seek funding for a Strategic Environment and Social Assessment for the road. 
133 African Network for Animal Welfare v A-G, Utd Republic of Tanzania, Reference No 9 of 2010, Judgment of 
20 June 2014, available via the website of the East African Community at <http://www.eac.int/>.  Its right to 
undertake other programmes or policies which would not impact negatively on the environment and 
ecosystem of the Park was, of course, explicitly preserved.   This was not seen to exclude some upgrading of 
the existing track for the purposes of tourism and park administration, a project towards which Tanzania itself 
now seemed to be inclining in any event. 
measures designed to preserve, protect and enhance the quality of the natural environment.134 It is 
therefore clear that, even in the realm of an arrangement designed primarily for economic 
development, the commitment to conservation was not seen as mere window-dressing. 
Yet, for all that, it would plainly be as much of an error to overstate the practical impact of these 
natural concomitants of international legal obligation as to overlook them altogether. Not only will 
the contribution of international courts and tribunals to the consolidation of conservation 
commitment remain relatively modest, it may also be further diluted by the possibility that disputes 
regarding the application of legal measures designed for conservation purposes may actually fall to 
be litigated within tribunals that perceive their most important policy priorities to lie elsewhere, and 
whose technical expertise is accordingly focused upon different areas of law entirely.135 The vital 
need is therefore to prompt wide-ranging institutional action designed to counter the substantive 
fragmentation that is currently evident amongst these various bodies of norms, through the far 
more effective integration of the particular rules they contain.   
As noted above, this integrative process is already under way in a formal sense. It is, of course, 
mandated in rudimentary fashion by the law of treaties itself, in the form of Article 31(3)(c) of the 
1969 Vienna Convention, by which the process of treaty interpretation is to be informed by the 
principle of “systemic integration” of legal norms generally.136 In most cases, however, this minimum 
requirement is overlain by explicit provision in the key treaties themselves, which typically allows for 
(though without necessarily securing in practice) some more sophisticated mode of accommodation 
to occur.137 The problem of fragmentation generally has, of course, been the specific subject of 
formal investigation by the International Law Commission,138 though a case could certainly be made 
that this represents one of their least impressive and successful enterprises to date.  
Accordingly, if there is one vital goal to which legal research and scholarship might most profitably 
be directed it would be the advancement and acceleration of this process of harmonisation and 
reconciliation between the general principles of biodiversity conservation and those governing other 
key areas of international endeavour, such as economic development, international trade, human 
rights and the protection of international peace and security.139  Needless to say, this point has 
already been widely recognised in an abstract sense, being enshrined in the principle of integration, 
                                                          
134 1999 Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, text also available via its website, id.  
These obligations were generated by a combination of Articles 5(3)(c), 8(1)(c), 111(2) and 114(1).  The fact that 
a later Protocol designed to give more concrete and detailed expression to these environmental commitments 
was not yet in force was not regarded as material.  It is noteworthy that the court envisaged possible adverse 
effects not only on the Serengeti itself but also on the neighbouring Masai Mara Park in Kenya. 
135 A particularly notable example can be found in the dispute settlement arrangements of the WTO, though 
even here the bodies in question have moved gradually towards the more meaningful recognition of the 
sustainable development ideal (which is, after all, explicitly enshrined in its preamble). For an overview of the 
significance of litigation in the environmental field, see Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell (n 56), 250-262. 
136 For discussion, see C McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Interpretation and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna 
Convention’ (2005) 54 ICLQ 290; D French, ‘Treaty Interpretation and the Incorporation of Extraneous Legal 
Rules’ (2006) ICLQ 281-314. 
137 See, e.g., CBD, Article 22; CITES, Article 14; CMS, Article 12. 
138 For details of the Commission’s programme of work, see its website at <legal.un.org/ilc/guide/1_1.htm>  
139 The importance of legal scholarship in the development of international conservation law was explicitly 
acknowledged by the Brazilian judge, Judge Cançado Trindade, in para. 71 of his individual opinion in the 
Whaling case (n 105). 
which finds reflection in the Rio Declaration and other key instruments.140 Yet the undeniable reality 
is, regrettably, that this principle has itself not yet been fully integrated into the international legal 
order, or adequately reflected, respected and consolidated into the practice of international society, 
in either in its governmental or non-governmental dimension. The principal focus of attention across 
the majority of areas of political activity is still almost invariably upon some very obvious and 
immediate – albeit commonly less essential – matter of human concern, whereas our absolute 
ultimate dependence upon the ecosystem services that other species and their interactions provide 
for us is something that requires a significantly more sophisticated, well-informed and reflective 
form of appreciation.141   
To the extent, therefore, that there is currently an unmet requirement for the bringing to bear of a 
‘vision’ of some kind, it would seem to relate to the means by which the imperative of biodiversity 
conservation can be woven more effectively into the fabric of global policy and practice. The key 
question accordingly becomes: what precise form should this vision ideally take?  This is not, 
unfortunately, a question that can be answered with any certainty on the basis of Wandesforde-
Smith’s own account, for his pronouncements on the matter are decidedly Delphic. 
 
4.  The Envisioning of Vision Itself 
One factor which contributes particularly to this ambiguity concerns the way in which his discussion 
appears to drift casually between the language of international law and international politics 
without any apparent need being felt for the establishment of any obvious lines of demarcation 
between the two.142 This deficiency is a significant one, for, while the international politics of 
conservation plainly subsumes all the various elements of legal regulation that involve a supra-
national dimension, it at the same time constitutes a much wider field of human endeavour, 
embracing many other forms of transnational activity. The World Conservation Strategy, for 
example, was a sophisticated attempt by a consortium of international organisations to elaborate a 
strategy for harmonising the goals of economic development and environmental protection, and 
setting out the means by which they might realistically be achieved. It does not of itself constitute 
law in any sense, however, since it is couched in descriptive and programmatic rather than 
normative terms.143 The utilisation of legal measures is of course discussed, but only as one of the 
various means that might be employed to implement the strategy.144 In similar fashion, the 
articulation of ‘Proposed Legal Principles for Environmental Protection and Sustainable 
Development’ appeared as only one element within the report of the Brundtland Commission.145   
                                                          
140 See, e.g., Rio Declaration, Principle 4; Stockholm Declaration, Principle 13; World Charter for Nature, 
Principle 7. 
141 Note in this context the potential contribution of IPBES (n 24). 
142 That being so, it is especially surprising to encounter within it (Wandesforde Smith (n 11), at 90) a complaint 
that ‘it is striking in the new book [i.e., Lyster] ... how little discrimination there is among all the arenas or 
fronts in which the international politics of wildlife are played out’, since that is exactly the charge that might 
justly be levelled against the reviewer himself. 
143 That said, it does of course form an important part of the policy backcloth on to which all subsequent legal 
developments should sensibly be projected. 
144 See especially Chapter 15, which is merely one of twenty chapters in all. 
145 WCED, Our Common Future (OUP, 1987); see especially Chapter 12 and Annexe I. 
In international affairs, accordingly, law must be seen as only one of the many factors which serve to 
shape human conduct, much of which is scarcely affected by it at all, except perhaps in the negative 
sense that there is no explicit legal prohibition of the behaviour in question. Indeed, where ordinary 
private citizens are concerned, law of the public international variety is likely to appear especially 
peripheral and remote. Thus, in the particular field of conservation, it would be possible for a 
committed individual to engage in a lifetime of dedicated activity without overtly having to confront 
it at all. This commitment might take any one of a number of forms, including educating others to 
the practical importance of conservation, exploring and developing the scientific understanding 
through which it can be accomplished, participating in the maintenance or management of wildlife 
reserves, fund-raising for conservation activities or simply re-organising one’s own personal lifestyle 
in such a way as to reduce the material demands it imposes upon the natural ecosystems of which 
they form part.   
In the light of these considerations, it is surely bizarre to suggest, as Wandesforde-Smith appears to 
do,146 that an environmental activist wishing to obtain guidance regarding what they should do next 
could sensibly expect to secure an answer from a monograph on international law! Such a work is 
intended neither as a clarion call to conservation action, nor as a practical manual for everyday 
activism – functions which are, after all, now amply served by numerous other publications.147 
Accordingly, the only reasonable response to someone who made the mistake of seeking 
enlightenment of this sort from a book like Lyster would be to echo the one helpfully offered by the 
apochryphal bystander, when asked by a would-be traveller for directions to the railway station: ‘If I 
were you, I wouldn’t start from here!’ 
 
4.1 Understanding the Roles of Actors in the International Legal Order 
None of this should be taken to suggest, however, that the legal regime governing biodiversity 
conservation globally is of no importance or interest to individuals or other non-state entities, or 
even that they have no direct or significant role to play within it. To the contrary, Wandesforde-Smith 
is quite correct to note the substantial transformation that has occurred over the course of the last 
century with regard to the agencies through which the various activities that fall within the purview 
of international law are characteristically conducted. Although commerce and other forms of 
economic, social and cultural co-operation between individuals, corporations and other private 
sector bodies have long been pursued on a transnational basis, and sometimes on a truly massive 
scale,148 the vast bulk of international intercourse was traditionally conducted through the diplomatic 
organs of national government. During this period, the ‘international community’ was accordingly 
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148 Perhaps the most obvious instances are provided by the para-statal activities of bodies like the Dutch East 
India Company during the 17th and 18th Centuries. 
viewed as being essentially a community of states (and a rather small number of them at that), and 
the legal order by which it was served was therefore typically characterised as the law of nations.149  
In more recent times, however, the nature of this political community and legal order has been 
radically reconfigured through a series of significant developments, including (i) the vast proliferation 
of inter-governmental organisations that have come to assume technical or political functions on 
behalf of the community as a whole, (ii) the direct conferral of legal personality on individual human 
beings as a consequence of the recognition and development of the human rights regime and (iii) the 
emergence of non-governmental organisations as major players in many of the most important areas 
of international political activity. 
 
In the wildlife field, NGOs have come to occupy a particularly crucial role, and to fulfil a vast array of 
functions which would once have been thought far beyond their remit or capacity. Thus, they have 
not only agitated for the adoption of treaty arrangements, but actually undertaken a major role in 
the drafting process itself; they have not simply monitored states parties in the performance of their 
conservation commitments but sometimes secured the opportunity to incorporate the results of this 
supervision within formal treaty compliance procedures; they have provided the initiative, expertise 
and resources that were required to make particular substantive conservation projects a reality; they 
have been allocated decision-making functions for the purpose of certain regimes and even provided 
secretariat services on occasion; in some cases, to conclude, they have been granted formal 
‘partnership’ status that guarantees them, inter alia, a place at the table of every key committee that 
operates within the regime in question. 150  Accordingly, any account of the contemporary 
conservation regime is bound to make extensive reference to their involvement.   
 
Yet for all that there have been certain features of the legal system which have remained essentially 
unchanged: most importantly, states themselves have never relinquished control of either the 
mechanisms of law-making or the processes through which legal personality is formally recognised, 
with the result that their traditional stranglehold over the legal order has been to a considerable 
extent retained.151 Thus, when such organisations as IUCN, ICBP and the International Waterfowl 
Research Bureau began to agitate during the 1960s for a reversal of the progressive loss of wetland 
habitat that was beginning to imperil the survival prospects of numerous species of birds, they 
immediately recognised that they would be unable to make significant substantive headway without 
sponsorship and support from states that were sympathetically disposed towards the project.  
Fortunately, this was in the event forthcoming from certain key quarters, including most notably the 
Dutch and Soviet governments, which worked with them on successive drafts of a treaty text, and 
that of Iran, who proved willing to host the diplomatic conference at which the evolving instrument 
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150 See generally Sands & Peel (n 57), 86-92 and the literature there cited.  The Ramsar Convention – on which 
see Lyster, Chapter 13 and GVT Matthews, The Ramsar Convention on Wetlands: Its History and Development 
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was finalised and opened for signature.152 No less importantly, some 23 governments actually turned 
up to attend this event, without which the entire project would have remained still-born in 
normative terms.153   
 
Of course, given the vital role that these NGOs had played in the drafting and development of the 
agreement in question, it could hardly have been expected that they would thereafter simply stand 
back to watch passively how events unfolded. To the contrary, the intention was always that they 
would continue to participate directly in its ongoing implementation, and provision was therefore 
made for the convening of periodic conferences at which progress could be monitored by all the key 
stakeholders.154  Yet the non-governmental bodies within this group would inevitably remain 
dependent upon the degree of latitude that governments themselves were prepared to grant them 
in that regard: full, front-line participation as of right in this convention for wetland conservation 
would naturally only be open to statal entities,155 since any other arrangement would inevitably have 
undermined the formal legal status of the entire arrangement. Part of the reason for this, of course, 
is that it will be states themselves which, in formal terms, actually assume, and ultimately remain 
accountable for, the conservation responsibilities that such treaties impose.     
The fact that, where law specifically is concerned, the formal primacy of governmental responsibility 
remains essentially unchanged seems largely to pass unnoticed in Wandesforde-Smith’s analysis, 
and possibly stems from his failure to maintain a clear distinction between the political and the more 
narrowly legal aspects of international conservation endeavours. For example, he suggests at one 
point that  
In retrospect, Lyster’s insistence that the political will of governments and their 
investments in what today we would call implementation capacity are the critical factors 
for wildlife has about it a starchy whiff of the formal institutional stiffness that used to 
characterize international law and international lawyers before 1945. While people in 
government are certainly still part of the starburst constellation of actors seeking to 
shape international wildlife law and its outcomes, the initiative and the balance of 
influence, if not power, now more often seems to lie with non-state actors.156 
 
The observation seems open to question on a number of accounts. Read in context, Lyster’s point 
was surely not so much that the political will and capacity of governments are the ‘critical factors for 
wildlife’, or even for its conservation, but rather for the much more specific question of the capacity 
of international law as such to make a contribution in that regard. As we have seen, international 
law is only one of the mechanisms and processes through which this objective might reasonably be 
pursued, and in many of these alternative modes of conservation activity the potential role of non-
governmental agencies for the achievement of progress through their own unaided efforts may 
doubtless be considerably greater. Where international law itself is concerned, however, the role of 
governments will continue to be crucial, and would remain so even where (as may very well often be 
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153 Though five of these attended purely in the capacity of observers: id. 
154 Article 6, which was amended in 1987. 
155 On the question of participation, see Article 9. 
156 Wandesforde-Smith (n 11), at 86-87, reflecting on the observations of Lyster (n 10), at 303-304. 
the case) they opt to place reliance upon the enthusiasm, initiative, expertise and resources of civil 
society in the course of discharging their responsibilities. Indeed, even a nation which goes so far as 
actually to delegate the performance of certain practical conservation functions to an NGO or other 
private sector agency will be obliged at the very least to equip itself with the powers needed to 
supervise the body in question, and, where necessary, to coax or coerce it into more effective 
action. For all their undoubted practical influence, non-state entities remain in the twilight zone of 
formal legal personhood on the international legal plane. In addition, the practical fulfilment of the 
conservation commitments imposed by treaty regimes will typically require the adoption of legal 
measures at the national level, and here again it is only states and governments that have ultimate 
capacity and authority in that regard. Consequently, Lyster’s observations were not only perfectly 
apposite at the time of their publication, but remain so today.   
As far as claims to have detected the ‘whiff of starch’ are concerned,157 there are surely strong 
grounds for questioning whether starch itself should ever be seen as something merely to be sniffed 
at – it is, after all, the very fuel of life itself!158 And while it would plainly be excessive to make this 
claim of international law as such, its potential impact on human behaviour does at least resemble 
that of starch in its processed form, in terms of its specific capacity to stiffen the fabric of whatever 
conservationist apparel we have seen fit to assume at any given moment; it is, indeed, for that very 
reason that those in the ‘international environmental movement’ have so frequently sought to 
invoke its authority and support.  The system undoubtedly has a great many weaknesses, but there 
has always been a very significant difference between, on the one hand, the charge that a 
government has failed to follow an appropriate policy in some particular respect and, on the other, 
the allegation that it has failed to comply with a specific legal obligation.     
If, therefore, the authors of the new edition of Lyster should appear to have decided – as 
Wandesforde-Smith suggests – to ‘stick to their legal last’,159 that will doubtless be because it is, 
after all, the law which constitutes the specific focus of their study. As it happens, moreover, the 
particular metaphor employed here seems more apposite than its creator may have realised, on the 
grounds that, where the fundamentals of the international legal system are concerned, we are 
indeed compelled for the time being to make do and mend with the cobbled-up normative order 
that we have inherited from our forebears.160  Since this system has encountered considerable 
difficulty even in tackling its most loudly proclaimed concerns, such as the eradication of torture or 
of military aggression, it is only to be expected that it will struggle to cope effectively with the more 
subtle, complex and wide-ranging challenges posed by environmental degradation. Yet while 
international law undoubtedly remains a relatively primitive system, it is this very trait which 
suggests not only that it might retain an inherent capacity for evolutionary advance, but also that 
the serious, systematic and scholarly exploration of its current strengths and weaknesses might have 
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158 Thus, it has recently been observed that starch, which is a carbohydrate produced by green plants as an 
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a significant part to play in this process of ongoing development. And since the law governing 
conservation is predominantly treaty-based, it stands to reason that treaty regimes must form the 
primary focus of scholarly attention. 
 
4.2 Understanding the Role of Treaties in the International Legal Order 
Accordingly, as Wandesforde-Smith himself observes:161  
Lyster put a focus on wildlife treaties.  Now, twenty-five years later, there are more 
wildlife treaties than ever, and on top of that even more treaties addressing other global 
issues that have cross-cutting consequences for the future welfare of species and 
habitats. The new book comes to grips superbly with the details of this new legal reality 
in all of its complexity.  
 
The authors will, I am sure, be extremely grateful for this generous endorsement of their efforts, 
especially since it suggests that the fundamental object and purpose of the book – namely to 
present ‘a clear and authoritative analysis of the key treaties which regulate the conservation of 
wildlife and habitat protection, and of the mechanisms available to make them work’ – has been 
amply achieved.      
It seems, however, to be this very objective itself which the reviewer seeks to call into question, in 
suggesting that what the new edition162   
does not seem to grasp and certainly does not venture to say anywhere is that the great 
age of wildlife and environmental treaty making, the age gathering a full head of steam 
as Lyster set pen to paper, is over.  The political and economic conditions that brought it 
into existence are gone and may not soon, if ever, return.  Doing more of the same and 
lots of it is not, therefore, a realistic option.   
 
Once again, this claim requires a good deal of unpicking. First, it can certainly be acknowledged that 
no statement of the kind alluded to will be found in the new edition, though the reasons why its 
inclusion would never have been contemplated have more to do with the doubts that must be 
entertained regarding its substantive pertinence and cogency than with any other consideration. To 
begin with the less important reservation that might be maintained, the statement is of 
questionable factual accuracy on a number of counts. For one, to the extent that it actually matters 
to identify the precise ‘heyday’ of conservation treaty-making, it would surely be the 1970s, rather 
than the late 80s, that had the strongest claim: indeed, it was very probably the spate of key treaties 
that emerged during that period that originally prompted Simon Lyster to consider it worthwhile 
‘setting pen to paper’ in the first place.163   
Equally, although the flow of international ‘legislative’ activity has arguably slowed a little since the 
original appearance of his work, the negotiation and adoption of wildlife treaties certainly has not 
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halted: 164 most obviously, the Biodiversity Convention itself has been concluded, followed by three 
rather significant protocols and a separate treaty on plant genetic resources. This period has also 
witnessed the conclusion of important agreements on watercourses, mountains and forests, a 
revised version of the regional conservation regime for Africa, as well as a whole clutch of ancillary 
instruments adopted within the framework of the Migratory Species Convention. In addition, there 
has been a succession of crucial agreements addressing different aspects of fisheries conservation. A 
further noteworthy development, potentially heralding a new direction for wildlife protection, 
entailed the adoption of a treaty concerning individual animal welfare, conceived entirely 
independently of any threat to the survival of the species covered.165 Furthermore, even had the 
procreative process regarding new legal instruments actually ground to a halt entirely, the most 
plausible explanation could surely have been found in the fact that the great majority of the 
principal substantive contexts where protection is currently required (barring, perhaps, additional 
measures to address the needs of particular categories of migratory species) are probably now 
covered.   
Yet this element of factual shakiness is largely overshadowed by the fact that the reviewer’s 
assertion is almost entirely beside the point, for there is surely no-one who would suggest that the 
explication and analysis of international wildlife law can somehow be reduced to a mere inventory of 
instruments adopted. To the contrary, what should form the proper focus of the attention of 
international wildlife lawyers is not ‘the great age of wildlife and environmental treaty making’ as 
such but rather the complex ongoing process of application and development of treaty-based 
regulation, which is a very much more wide-ranging phenomenon. Anyone who believes that this 
latter process has run out of steam has plainly not been paying sufficiently close attention. For the 
reality is that states continue to turn up in impressive numbers for the ongoing cycles of meetings of 
the Conferences of the Parties to these conventions, to formulate and approve resolutions and 
recommendations regarding their interpretation and application, to devise and refine mechanisms 
and procedures for their more effective implementation and to support or participate in the many 
subsidiary bodies, committees and regional offshoot activities that the business of these regimes 
tends to generate. In addition, a great deal of time, effort and resources is being expended on the 
development of legal and institutional capacity to translate these international commitments into 
substantive progress on the ground at the national level.166  Furthermore, it seems scarcely 
appropriate to suggest, as the reviewer does, that this amounts simply to ‘more of the same’,167 
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167 At 93. 
because the tools, techniques, processes and procedures that are currently available for the 
environmental repair and restoration process are now of a decidedly superior order than those that 
were ever available to earlier generations.   
This process effectively began, of course, with the incorporation into wildlife conservation treaties of 
institutional arrangements of the kind pioneered by Ramsar, transforming them into much more of 
an organic process, and thereby generating the potential for evolutionary change in the quality and 
quantity of normative responses to environmental problems.  It is, however, only during the last few 
decades that these new institutional mechanisms have been established within the international 
community,168 and given the very slow pace of change in international legal affairs it is certain to 
take time before their potential can be explored and exploited to maximum effect.  It is only in the 
light of considerations such as these that the real evolutionary potential of international wildlife law 
can properly be assessed.  
The conviction that a very great deal is to be gained from the meticulous application to international 
wildlife law of the traditional techniques of legal scholarship is, moreover, only strengthened by 
consideration of Wandesforde-Smith’s personal prescription for progress in this area, which appears 
to involve dedication to the pursuit of what he describes as ‘interstitial headway’.169  Now it must 
first be observed that, coming as it does from one who has specified as a key aim of legal scholarship 
the provision of a rallying cry to inject renewed impetus into environmental activism, this is scarcely 
the most inspirational of slogans.  Part of the difficulty here, no doubt, lies in the obscurity of the 
concept itself, a problem that is compounded by the fact that its promulgator omits to offer any 
concrete illustrations to shed light on the matter.  Only the following general explanation of the idea 
is presented:170 
This is the pursuit of initiatives that give the law new leverage and power by discerning 
and exploiting in the nooks and crannies of the law as it stands, and of the regimes it has 
already created, chances to put the pressure on, in Lyster’s phrase, in fresh and 
unexpected and, therefore, potentially productive ways.  It might come from framing 
problems in a new legal light or by putting before established institutions legal options 
to act in ways that they have not previously considered as within their remit.     
 
It is at this point that one might reasonably conclude that what is being marketed here is essentially 
old wine in an old bottle, but under cover of a new label. For opportunities of the kind envisaged are 
exactly what might be expected to be unearthed by the systematic legal analysis of conservation 
treaty regimes, and in particular the arrangements for their implementation. This was, of course, 
precisely the reason why it was decided to incorporate an entirely new chapter concerning 
implementation and enforcement in the opening section of Lyster, and to greatly expand the 
attention devoted to such matters in the majority of the individual chapters. In each case, 
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furthermore, due attention is given to the role of private sector actors in this context alongside that 
of states parties themselves.171 
None of this, however, should be taken to suggest that the broad approach adopted in Lyster 
towards the structuring of its subject-matter – essentially a regime-by-regime analysis of 
international wildlife treaties, bolstered by the presentation of various cross-cutting issues and 
underlying contextual commonalities – represents the only legitimate way in which the topic can be 
addressed. To the contrary, there is a most vital and urgent need for the compilation of works which 
adopt alternative and complementary approaches, and in particular those which delve more deeply 
into the practical efficacy of particular treaty initiatives, identify and analyse more fully the recurrent 
themes and problems which pervade the regulatory landscape of conservation conventions 
generally, explore the many interfaces of international wildlife law with other specialist areas of 
legal concern, and evaluate its role and contribution within the international legal order as a whole. 
It is, indeed, precisely with these matters in mind that this present Research Handbook was 
conceived in the first place. Accordingly, it is hoped that it may serve as a modest means both of 
establishing and of advancing a regulatory vision and agenda for the future. 
 
5.  Conclusions: 2020 Vision and Beyond 
In the light of all the above considerations, it should be possible to develop some sort of viable 
‘vision’ for international wildlife law which can be drawn upon to guide the development both of the 
legal regime for the global conservation of biological diversity and the growing body of legal 
scholarship through which it is elucidated. In the first instance, this should entail the abandonment 
of any hopes for grand epiphanies, smart dodges or quick and easy solutions, and the continued 
dedication to work of a more grounded, potentially gruelling and unflaggingly meticulous character. 
More specifically, these endeavours should remain focused upon the deployment of traditional legal 
skills to best advantage in the thorough and thoughtful analysis and evaluation of the principles, 
practices and processes through which the conservation of nature is addressed and effectuated on 
the international plane. There is ample evidence that those charged with organisational 
responsibility for the implementation of the treaties in question will pay heed to serious scholarship 
which successfully exposes weaknesses and inconsistencies in or amongst the regimes in question.172  
There is, moreover, a long tradition of treaty bodies actively commissioning formal legal opinions on 
issues of current controversy and concern.173 Elsewhere within the legal community, the members 
both of international courts and tribunals and of law reform agencies such as the International Law 
Commission have also shown themselves to be receptive to the lessons taught by legal 
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scholarship.174 The slowly growing impetus generated by such processes is now just beginning to 
enhance the profile of international environmental law, including that relating to the conservation of 
biological diversity.   
As noted above, this enhanced sense of priority and understanding may ultimately prove to be of 
greatest significance in relation to the task of achieving a more effective accommodation of 
conservation interests with cognate areas of international law, as reflected above all in the regimes 
which govern such matters as international trade, the international economy, peace and security 
and human rights. Although these have all traditionally been accorded a much higher priority than 
environmental protection, the realisation is very gradually beginning to dawn that none of the 
aspirations by which these regimes are motivated is remotely capable of achievement unless the life 
support systems of the planet can be effectively assured. Thus, organisations such as the World Bank 
and the WTO have already taken some preliminary, tentative steps towards the more effective 
recognition of environmental protection as a cornerstone of sustainable development, while lawyers 
specialising in human rights and the use of force are very belatedly coming to realise the extent to 
which all their traditional efforts can effectively be set at naught by the ravages of environmental 
insecurity.  As yet, however, the practitioners of these disciplines have barely begun to recognise the 
overriding importance of, still less to engage in any meaningful way with, the specific question of 
biodiversity conservation, or with the principles and processes through which it can best be 
secured.175   
 
5.1. Discarding the Blinkers of the ‘Enlightenment’ Worldview 
As suggested above, one of the principal challenges in this context undoubtedly derives from the 
extent to which the current global societal order, together with the academic disciplines by which it 
is ultimately underpinned (most notably politics, philosophy and economics) have remained trapped 
in the intellectual stranglehold imposed by a worldview that was originally developed by the likes of 
John Locke, Adam Smith and Immanuel Kant during the period of European history rather 
questionably known as the Enlightenment. It is a major irony of this era of intense disputation and 
debate that, although the one principal issue upon which every one of its major luminaries appeared 
to agree was the need for their theories to have a firm foundation in science, the only significant 
body of scientific expertise that was actually available to them comprised the Newtonian laws of 
motion and mechanics.176 Needless to say, there are very severe limitations upon the level of 
understanding that can be attained with regard to the operations of human society and its relations 
with the natural world on the basis of analogies drawn from the circling of the planets and the 
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collisions of billiard balls! While such a knowledge base, particularly when combined with the then 
nascent disciplines of chemistry and thermodynamics, proved an excellent springboard for launching 
the industrial and urban revolutions in human lifestyle, it had little or nothing of value to say about 
the preservation and cultivation of the natural resource base upon which all such developments 
must ultimately be posited. Indeed, such resources were widely asserted to be inexhaustible.177 
Accordingly, luminaries such as Kant and Hume explicitly advocated the clearance of forests and the 
draining of marshes as a means of advancing human welfare and convenience.178 In Kant’s mind, this 
was merely the application of those powers of rational deliberation which had liberated humankind 
from the constraints of natural causation! 
The crucial problem here was that, even by the very end of the period in question, the most basic 
principles of biology were only just beginning to be formulated, while those of genetics, psychology, 
ecology and complex systems still remained effectively in the realms of terra incognita, if not terra 
improvisa. Eventually, moreover, even the one sure source of scientific guidance at the time, 
Newtonian physics, was to be exposed by the emergence of quantum theory as providing no more 
than the most rough-and-ready depiction of underlying reality. Accordingly, for all the undoubted 
intellectual genius from which they were spun, and the nuggets of genuine insight that they 
contained, far too many of the pronouncements of these luminaries rested on little more than 
personal preconception, tendentious speculation and recycled superstition.  Even at the very summit 
of their sophistication, Enlightenment conceptions of human nature and relationship to the rest of 
the living world were far too primitive and preposterous to merit any serious measure of continued 
credence. Yet much of our contemporary thinking is still inclined to treat them as if they were 
unchallengeable truth.179  Indeed, it must surely be counted as the major intellectual tragedy of the 
19th and 20th centuries that, as intellectual specialisation set in, disciplines such as philosophy and 
economics opted progressively to abandon the crucial Enlightenment injunction to ensure that all 
theorising remained continuously grounded upon the principles of natural science, while at the same 
time appearing to embrace whole-heartedly the crudely unenlightened ‘junk’ that was merely the 
product of its premature application.180 As a result, we have allowed ourselves to be seduced by a 
worldview that is altogether too simplistic, atomistic, mechanistic, materialistic, individualistic, 
humanistic, hubristic and, in the final analysis, wholly unrealistic.181 
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Yet, as vital as it is for the flourishing of the human species that this worldview be brought back into 
line with reality, it cannot plausibly be supposed that international wildlife lawyers in their capacity 
as such can be at the forefront of the revolution in thinking that is so urgently required. As 
concerned citizens, they should undoubtedly endeavour to ensure that their voices remain 
prominent in the escalating chorus for reform, but it is to the practitioners of the disciplines that lie 
at the heart of the problem that the world must principally look for change.182 With that in mind, it is 
encouraging to note that some of the most insistent demands for the transformation of economics 
are currently emanating from undergraduate students in that field, who not unnaturally feel entitled 
to expect that their studies should equip them with the kind of knowledge that might actually 
withstand scrutiny and application in the real world.183 Perhaps a similar openness to radical reform 
within the discipline of philosophy might do something to counter the depressingly low levels of 
current student interest in the subject.  
Nevertheless, it would be naive in the extreme to suppose that it will be easy to expunge the 
pervasive imprints of this intellectual legacy from popular consciousness, not least because it 
appears to accord so closely with the semi-detached, suburban, self-indulgent consumerist lifestyles 
that already represent the ongoing reality for many of us, and the ardent aspiration for countless 
others. It may, however, be feasible to ensure that such a mindset comes at least to be balanced by 
one that reminds us that our apparent disjunction from the natural world is a mere illusion of short-
term perspective, and thereby serves to bring us back down to (mother) Earth.184 In particular, it will 
be salutary to be reminded that all the crucial ecological services and life support systems upon 
which our existence ultimately depends, including the very air that we breathe, do not represent an 
inevitable, natural outcome of the aggregation of matter into planetary form, but have been 
patiently assembled for us over time by the innumerable interactions of the diversity of life-forms 
that have chanced to emerge (perhaps uniquely in the universe) on one particular planet – ours. 
Furthermore, we disrupt the fundamental processes of this biosphere at our peril, since, however 
much we may flatter ourselves, the fleeting fads and fancies of arriviste decision-makers of our ilk 
may struggle to match the wisdom and rationality encapsulated in three-and-a-half billion years of 
small-scale, highly distributed and continuously sustained trial-and-error experiments in life support.   
Nor would we seem well-advised to place our faith in those enduring but as yet inadequately 
substantiated Humanist assumptions regarding the unrelenting tendency towards progress in 
human affairs,185 since the historical record (the absolute entirety of which is in any event currently 
far too short in evolutionary terms to permit any meaningful conclusions in this regard) might 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
contextualising functions of the right, see I McGilchrist, The Master and His Emissary: The Divided Brain and 
the Making of the Western World (Yale UP, 2010).  
182 It is open to question whether even the more progressive elements within the discipline, who concede (at 
p.8) that nature ‘has been ill-served by 20th century economics’, can display the flexibility and imagination 
needed to transform their discipline: see D Helm and C Hepburn (eds.), Nature in the Balance: The Economics 
of Biodiversity (OUP, 2014). 
183 See Ha-Joon Chang and J Aldred, ‘After the Crash, We Need A Revolution in the Way We Teach Economics’ 
The Observer (London, 11 May 2014), which notes inter alia the launching of the International Student 
Initiative for Pluralism in Economics, now a collaboration of 65 student associations from 30 countries 
distributed across six continents, as to which see <http://www.isipe.net>.  For a disappointingly (if predictably) 
muted account of these developments, see the Economist magazine (London, 7 February 2015), at 27. 
184 This is part of the purpose of the UN’s Harmony with Nature project, as to which, see note 103 above. 
185 For a sample of writings reflecting this way of thinking, see I Kramnick (ed.), The Portable Enlightenment 
Reader (Penguin, 1995), 351-395.  
actually be interpreted to demonstrate that apparent steps forward in one area of activity tend to be 
offset or even occasionally outflanked by regression in others.  So here it is evident that humans in 
pre-industrial societies will have maintained a much clearer grasp of our relations with the natural 
world, for the simple reason that their everyday lives more directly and immediately depended upon 
it. Subsequently, however, our intuitive sense of such matters has been progressively eroded by the 
very nature of urban living, occupational specialisation and participation in the exchange economy – 
the very phenomena that Enlightenment scholars trumpeted as the engines of progress. Today, we 
must recognise that, for all the benefits they may have brought us, they have also caused us to lose 
sight of certain fundamental truths. Accordingly, if we are to retain any realistic prospect of fulfilling 
our aspirations for sustainable development, we will need not only to establish a viable vision to 
govern biodiversity conservation for the year 2020 and beyond but also, as a crucial part of that 
process, somehow contrive to restore or even improve upon our original capacity for 20:20 vision 
with respect to the workings of the world around us.186 
Hopefully, this process is already under way, since the accumulated wisdom of the chthonic 
communities is explicitly recognised in the CBD as a resource which states should protect and draw 
upon, wherever appropriate, in their formulation and application of conservation policy.187  In that 
respect, it has the potential to serve variously as an inspiration, a supplement, a placeholder, a 
means of corroboration or even occasionally as a short-term corrective to the proceeds of more 
formal scientific endeavours, reference to which is also recurrent within the convention.188 Through 
deployment of these twin sources of elucidation in the form of an epistemological pincer 
movement,189 it is hoped that the more ill-informed and environmentally-destructive relics of 
Enlightenment thinking can progressively be expurgated, in the interests of the international 
community as a whole.  
 
5.2 Sharpening the Focus upon ‘Community’ 
This discussion should also serve incidentally as a reminder of the twin senses of the word 
‘community’ itself, as highlighted in section three above, and in particular of the virtues of the 
pluralism and diversity which is still to be found within our global society, and of the way in which it 
may be possible to draw upon it in circumstances where some broad uniformity of response must 
ultimately be adopted in response to the emergence of threats which are common to us all. Indeed, 
if there is anything to be identified as a guiding ‘vision’ for international wildlife lawyers, above and 
beyond the crucial need for them to ‘stick resolutely to their legal last’ in the analysis and evaluation 
                                                          
186 ‘20/20 vision is a term used to express normal visual acuity (the clarity or sharpness of vision) measured at 
a distance of 20 feet.  If you have 20/20 vision, you can see clearly at 20 feet what should normally be seen at 
that distance.  If you have 20/100 vision, it means that you must be as close as 20 feet to see what a person 
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the relevance of science is actually pervasive throughout. 
189 By a curious coincidence, an interesting example of precisely this combinatorial process was reported on 
the very day that this passage was drafted: see E Sohn, ‘Inuit Wisdom and Polar Science Are Teaming Up to 
Save the Walrus’, available via <http://www.smithsonianmag.com/>, and derived from ‘What Now Walrus?’, 
Hakai Magazine (Victoria, BC, Canada, 22 April 2015). 
of their subject-matter, and avoid the distractions generated by popular polemics, it might perhaps 
be found in the furtherance of understanding and practical realisation of the concept of community 
in all its various nuances. For a community in its most basic sense is, as suggested above, essentially 
no more than an aggregation of (potentially very disparate) entities interacting within a defined 
boundary. As a variety of complex living system, it is defined principally by simple reference to the 
fact that the exchange of energy within the encircling rampart is markedly more intense than that 
which occurs beyond it. The two things that will necessarily prove fatal to its capacity for self-
maintenance are (i) if the barrier becomes totally impermeable to energy from without (for any 
closed system is doomed to the progressive dissipation and extinction of its internal order in 
accordance with the second law of thermodynamics) and (ii) that it should somehow lose the 
capacity to utilise this exogenous energy for the preservation of that internal order (in which case it 
will eventually disintegrate into and become indistinguishable from its surroundings in a functional 
sense). The biosphere itself represents a paradigm case here, because heterotrophs such as 
ourselves are entirely dependent upon the autotrophic life-forms to undertake the initial energy 
conversion (and starch creation) process which keeps us alive,190 while the service of recycling 
energy through the system is performed on our behalf by innumerable unheralded organisms from 
bats, bees and beetles to the microbes that permeate the soil.191  At the other end of the scale, apex 
predators and other keystone megafauna help to keep the whole system under overall operational 
control.192 It is therefore to the preservation and protection of community in its biological sense, and 
hence to the very possibility of community in any sense, that the work of wildlife law is ultimately 
directed.   
It follows from this that no conservation regime can hope to be remotely effective unless it pays 
adequate regard to the principles of conservation science, and especially its holistic focus, and it is 
precisely that consideration that has led to the gradual transformation of wildlife law from an 
essentially species-oriented endeavour to one that concentrates much more broadly on entire 
ecosystems and the biological communities of which they are composed. Accordingly, the ecosystem 
approach has become critical to the implementation of the CBD itself and of the other treaties that 
operate within its broad sphere of influence.193 For the lawyer, the crucial questions therefore 
concern the extent to which treaty regimes are currently giving adequate attention both to the 
major threats that have been identified to the functioning and integrity of biological communities, 
and to the optimal forms of response that have been specified to address them.   
 
5.3. Maintaining Momentum: The Present Handbook 
It will therefore come as no surprise that a key function of the present work is to address such 
questions.  In that vein, Arie Trouwborst analyses the extent to which treaty regimes are successfully 
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addressing the problem of habitat fragmentation, while Peter Davies investigates, through the prism 
of the EU regime, the ubiquitous problems posed by alien invasive species. The incidence of armed 
conflict represents another recurrent threat to wildlife, and this is examined in the chapter by Karen 
Hulme.  The conservation of vulnerable marine ecosystems is considered by Edward Goodwin, while 
Rosemary Rayfuse also examines the marine environment, but in the light specifically of the hazards 
posed by climate change, not only in the form of global warming but through the process of ocean 
acidification. With a particular emphasis on response strategies, Kees Bastmeijer considers the 
extent to which the managed restoration of ecosystems and their essential functioning processes 
represents a feasible solution or palliative to past failures to prevent harm.     
In addition to illuminating the substantive conservation principles by which wildlife treaty regimes 
are informed, these chapters shed incidental light upon the institutions and procedures through 
which they are operationalised, and this issue of course represents a crucial focus of study in its own 
right. It should be noted that the discipline of international environmental law has made a very 
significant contribution to the development of the international legal system generally, through its 
exploration of the various ways in which the treaty instrument can be reconceived and elaborated in 
order to maximise its potential impact. In particular, the investment of treaty regimes with elaborate 
institutional arrangements of a dedicated, quasi-autonomous kind has helped to transform the 
‘sleeping treaties’ – or perhaps, to adopt an alternative analogy, abiotic mechanisms – of the past 
into the familiar ‘living instruments’ of the modern era.194 These biological metaphors are employed 
advisedly, for contemporary conservation regimes are organic in more than a purely figurative 
sense, by virtue of their creation of a specialised form of political community for the achievement of 
their objectives. Furthermore, it can be argued that the strength of any system of this kind is likely to 
depend considerably upon the extent to which it successfully replicates the essential features of a 
natural ecosystem.195 Indeed, a political community, as noted above, is itself merely a variety of 
complex living system, and the plant geneticist Enrico Coen has recently argued that the same 
handful of basic principles in fact govern the functioning of all such entities, from individual living 
cells to entire human civilisations.196   
Given the importance of diversity as a source of strength, of critical importance to the maximisation 
of the potential of treaties is the question of participation, and especially its extension beyond the 
sphere of statehood. This question must therefore be kept under continuous scrutiny, and for the 
purposes of this work Elizabeth Kirk examines specifically the role of non-state actors in certain 
marine biodiversity treaty regimes.  Needless to say, the litmus test of the effectiveness of treaty 
institutions in this context will be seen by many as relating to the extent to which they prove 
successful in holding states to their commitments.  Karen Scott’s contribution is accordingly devoted 
to the investigation of the various procedures that have been adopted under wildlife treaties to date 
to address the crucial issue of non-compliance.  One of the many interesting points to emerge from 
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this study is the increasing occurrence of joint ventures by treaty bureaucracies in the 
implementation of such procedures, which serves as a reminder that such regimes operate not in 
splendid (or, perhaps one should say, wretched) isolation, but as part of a broader network or 
community of biodiversity-related conventions.  It would seem a reasonable aspiration that these 
regimes should not in any way compromise or undermine each other’s work, and wherever possible 
seek synergies and opportunities for collaboration.  The focus of Richard Caddell’s chapter is 
therefore upon the extent to which such aspirations have so far been realised in practice, and the 
prospects for further instances of mutual reinforcement in the future.   
This chapter also serves to confirm a point which is evident from certain other contributions already 
mentioned above, namely that many communities, whether of a normative or other character, 
commonly find themselves nested, after the fashion of Russian dolls, within broader systems or 
forms of polity. Thus, the network of biodiversity-related treaties to which Caddell refers can itself 
be located within a wider field of instruments devoted to environmental protection (as instanced by 
the interface between biodiversity and climate change, discussed by Rayfuse), and in turn within the 
still broader domain of international law generally (as exemplified in this work by the interaction of 
conservation norms with the regime governing armed conflict, explored by Hulme). As the 
perspective progressively widens in this way, the challenge of maintaining an appropriate degree of 
normative coherence tends to intensify, a point which is demonstrated very graphically in the 
chapter by Emilie Cloatre. This concerns the possibility of successfully reconciling – or at least 
reaching some form of workable accommodation between – the sharply contrasting regulatory 
demands of commerce and industrial property on the one hand and anthropology and human rights 
on the other in relation to the exploitation of biological resources. Since it is in the conservation 
forum that these contrasting perspectives have chanced to meet head on, the question arises as to 
whether the CBD represents an appropriate crucible to achieve a viable amalgam, or whether some 
other venue or approach might be needed for this purpose. It should also be apparent that the 
tension here arises from the clash of two very different cultural communities and epistemic 
traditions; one is derived from the Enlightenment injunction to subjugate, control and assert 
ownership over the natural world, and the other from a long pre-existing and hopefully still active 
disposition to submit to the rhythms of its regenerative process and thereby be prepared, at least to 
some extent, to dance to its chosen tunes. On this view, membership rather than ownership, and 
harmony rather than hegemony, may have to be the vital watchwords for our relationship with 
nature in the future. A viable legal solution to the problems regarding intellectual property is only 
likely to emerge from practice, but it should come as no surprise that this practice might itself entail 
a very great deal of trial and error. 
Certainly no single faction or interest-group should feel entitled to assume that its own preferences 
or proclivities will automatically prevail in this regard, but the fact that conservation has been 
conclusively declared to represent the common concern of all humankind should at least give every 
relevant constituency a measure of standing in the matter. Even the hallowed, and strongly 
reaffirmed,197 sovereignty of states over their living natural resources must now be exercised in 
conformity with the normative ethos of the CBD and other relevant instruments. Undeniably, the 
precise nature and implications of the common concern idea are not entirely pellucid, and Duncan 
French duly takes the opportunity in his chapter to offer further elaboration of the way in which the 
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concept is currently evolving.  Plainly, the attribution of this status stems from the acknowledged 
importance of biodiversity for the pursuit of sustainable development, which has become one of the 
defining objectives of the international community as a whole.  Yet this idea too, for all the attention 
that it has commanded from commentators, remains open to ongoing interpretation and exegesis, 
and Veit Koester accordingly takes on the task of examining the extent to which it has been 
respected and applied in the practice of the Biodiversity Convention itself. What cannot be denied is 
that a commitment to equity, in both its inter- and intra-generational dimensions, represents a key 
component, and it is this issue which forms the focus of the chapter by Malgosia Fitzmaurice, as 
reflected in the ongoing controversies played out in the International Whaling Commission, the 
constituent instrument of which was one of the first to contain explicit reference to such matters.  
Each one of these fundamental principles of international environmental law would seem to place a 
premium on the question of participation, since it has become widely accepted that the dictates of 
good governance demand that all those who form part of a political community should have some 
role to play in the elaboration of the normative processes by which they are regulated. As noted 
above, the issue is tackled directly in relation to marine biodiversity treaty regimes in the chapter by 
Kirk, and also represents a pervasive theme of Cloatre’s contribution insofar as it impacts upon 
indigenous communities and other traditional users of biological resources.  The elucidation of this 
topic is enriched still further by Nicole Mohammed’s instructive case study of participatory resource 
management in the Caribbean, which suggests that there are very considerable problems to be 
overcome in order to make the aspiration of public participation a meaningful reality. 
The significant practical problems associated with public participation produce the inevitable result, 
in many contexts, that it has to be realised in representative mode rather than personally.198 That 
being so, it is relevant to ask whether there might be claims or interests that merit representation in 
appropriate forums and procedures regardless of the fact that the entities to which they relate could 
never be envisaged as direct participants in their own right and on their own behalf. To put it 
another way, many – indeed, the vast majority – of those who hold stakes in the ultimate success of 
our conservation endeavours are not human at all, raising the question of whether and how their 
interests are to be taken into account. At root, of course, this is a matter of values, and whether only 
those of an exclusively anthropocentric orientation are worthy and capable of accommodation. This 
key question is revisited in the chapter which immediately follows the present one, in which Mattia 
Fosci and Tom West conclude that it would be preferable to pursue policies that aim to be 
compatible with both intrinsic and instrumental modes of valuation than to continue to argue about 
their relative importance. 
 
5.4. Final Reflections 
This preference for pluralism seems very much in line with the conclusions that have begun to 
emerge from reflections on the financial crash and other policy disasters of recent years.  As one 
leading financial expert puts it,199 
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If you are clear about your high-level goals and knowledgeable enough about the 
systems their achievement depends on, then you can solve problems in a direct way. But 
goals are often vague, interactions unpredictable, complexity extensive, problem 
descriptions incomplete, the environment uncertain. That is where obliquity comes into 
play. 
 
Where conservation is concerned, the ultimate truth is probably that even if we were disposed to be 
utterly selfish, we simply do not know enough to determine which elements of the natural world are 
critical to our own survival or success and which we can safely allow to go to the wall. The one thing 
of which we can be sure is that we are all part of the same global biotic community, and whereas a 
community of this kind does not necessarily involve much in the way of commonality, it does 
invariably involve highly complex networks of interdependence. It was considerations such as these 
that caused Aldo Leopold to conclude long ago that ‘a thing is right when it tends to preserve the 
integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise’.200 In 
consequence, we shall probably arrive ultimately at the same broad policy conclusions regardless of 
whether we resolve initially to set off along the road of prudential self-interest or that of expansive 
ethical altruism: as the 1991 revised version of the World Conservation Strategy made clear, respect 
and care for the community of life represents the underlying ethic that provides the foundation for 
all the other principles on which sustainable living depends.201  
Although we cannot easily calculate what level of investment in conservation is likely to be needed 
for this purpose, we should probably bank on it being considerably more than we have hitherto 
imagined we could possibly afford.202 This realisation helps, indeed, to explain why it is difficult to 
understand how an unreformed discipline of economics can ever play more than an important 
supporting role in the determination of policy priorities: by systematically disenfranchising all those 
beings who do not participate in the exchange economy, it merely serves to perpetuate the manifold 
and intractable problems that have been caused by the commodification of nature in the first place. 
Perhaps, then, its only real hope for redemption would lie in the recognition of historic property 
rights over natural ecosystems on the part of all those species that have traditionally inhabited 
them, and asking them (or more plausibly some trustee acting on their behalf) how much they 
would be prepared to accept by way of compensation for any projected loss or despoliation of their 
habitat!  
Since such an intellectual revolution might well take some considerable time to deliver, it would be 
preferable for the practitioners of other disciplines not simply to wait for it to happen, but rather to 
attempt in the meantime to make some more immediate progress of their own in the same general 
direction. For lawyers, this might entail exploring the various ways that might be found for giving a 
voice (if only through surrogates) to those countless stakeholders in the conservation process who, 
in the very nature of things, are constitutionally disabled from participation in verbal deliberation – 
that is to say, all those not of our own particular (sub-)species.  If this should seem outlandish, it is to 
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be remembered that the proposal already finds reflection in current arrangements to some extent 
through the admission to meetings of many treaty bodies of certain non-governmental entities 
‘technically qualified in protection, conservation or management of wild flora and fauna’. 203 Bodies 
with a proven record of positive contribution may in some cases see this recognised through the 
formal grant of ‘partnership’ status, which typically offers enhanced opportunities for participation.  
If there are treaties which deny or unduly hamper such engagement on the part of civil society, their 
practices might profitably be reconsidered.204 
Yet this approach does not of itself guarantee representivity of the kind envisaged, for it is not 
normally a requirement that such groups serve specifically as advocates for nature’s interests: many 
doubtless do, but others may not at all, especially where their qualification for entry is derived, say, 
from the function of ‘management’ rather than ‘protection’.205 Consequently, there is scope for the 
exploration of other possibilities, especially since most of these are unlikely to be mutually exclusive. 
It should not be assumed, moreover, that states themselves have no part to play in this process, and 
it may indeed be worthwhile to explore further the process of designating particular states as 
‘champions’ for certain species akin to that dabbled with by the Bonn Convention in connection with 
its ‘concerted actions’ procedure.206 Perhaps other comparable avenues will come to light from a 
detailed exploration of practice under wildlife treaties generally – and if this is now to be described 
as making ‘interstitial headway’, then so be it. 
 A further point to note is that the route to more effective representation of nature’s interests 
should certainly not be confined to the sphere of activities conducted under the aegis of existing 
conservation treaty institutions, as there may be scope for the utilisation also of judicial process for 
this purpose, whether at the national, regional or international level. Some examples have already 
been encountered earlier in this chapter, and it is for wildlife law researchers to ensure that there is 
a sufficient body of serious literature available to provide potential litigators with an adequate array 
of weapons for their forensic armoury. In addition to already familiar forms of legal action, the 
potential of new approaches should no doubt also be explored. There could hardly be a more 
auspicious moment than now, for while it was predictable that attempts to utilise the procedures of 
the European Convention on Human Rights for the benefit of hominids beyond our own species 
would be summarily rebuffed,207 it cannot pass unremarked that various media sources have 
reported, though perhaps prematurely, a writ of habeas corpus being granted in national law for the 
benefit of just such an unconventional applicant – to wit, an orang-utang in the courts of Argentina, 
following an earlier case concerning a chimpanzee in Brazil, where the judge declined  to rule out the 
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possibility in limine.208  While these cases obviously concern captive animals, seen purely as 
individuals, such breaches in the barrier of legal personhood may conceivably carry implications in 
the longer term for their counterparts in the wild as well, and on a collective basis. Indeed, it is 
noteworthy that there is already one wildlife treaty, the 2007 Agreement for the Conservation of 
Gorillas and Their Habitats,209 which appears to place unusually high emphasis upon the moral status 
and substantive interests of gorillas when set alongside that of their close relatives, our own 
species.210 It does not go so far as to recognise formal legal rights on their part, however, and it 
remains uncertain whether any such development in international law could offer a viable route 
towards progress in the field of conservation.  Nevertheless, the issue certainly seems worthy of 
further consideration and research.211 
This suggests that the time may well have come when Christopher Stone’s memorable question, 
‘Should Trees Have Standing?’ must receive more active and systematic attention.212 Certainly, the 
2012 Rio+20 Conference on Sustainable Development not only reaffirmed the need for promoting 
‘harmony’ with nature but went on to acknowledge that some countries already recognise the rights 
of nature in this context.213 This recognition may sometimes, perhaps, be essentially of a purely 
rhetorical character, but recent developments suggest that some states have been prepared to go 
further: thus, the website which the UN has dedicated to the harmony with nature project makes 
reference to what is presented as the first victory and explicit vindication of the rights of nature in a 
national court: a case in 2011 concerning the River Vilcabamba in Loja province, Ecuador.214 There is, 
moreover, other evidence that such ideas are now beginning to acquire a degree of traction in the 
legal realm.215      
Finally, and back outside the courtroom, consideration could profitably be given to the creation of 
entirely new types of legal forum or institution, despite the alleged waning of enthusiasm amongst 
governments for initiatives of this kind.  It is noteworthy that the coming to a close of the decade for 
biodiversity will coincide almost exactly with the centenary of the emergence on to the global stage 
of an institution that was entirely revolutionary for its time: the International Labour Organization.216  
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215 Note in particular the 2012 Wanganui River Treaty, a framework agreement between the Crown and certain 
indigenous communities in New Zealand, which recognises the river as a living entity in its own right, incapable 
of being ‘owned’ in an absolute sense and enjoying legal standing of its own. The text may be viewed at 
<http://www.harmonywithnatureun.org/content/documents/193WanganuiRiver Agreement--.pdf>  
216 The ILO was created pursuant to Part 13 of the 1919 Treaty of Peace with Germany, 225 CTS 188.  For its 
website, see <http:www.ilo.org/>, and for discussion of its activities see, e.g., S Hughes and N Haworth, The 
International Labour Organization (ILO): Coming in from the Cold (Routledge, 2011); JM Servais, International 
At a time when international law was resolutely statist in orientation, and well before the formal 
consolidation of human rights into the system, the creation of a body in which a tripartite structure 
was created to give an equal voice to workers and employers alongside that of governments must 
surely be counted as one of the most imaginative of all developments within the global legal order.  
Perhaps there is now scope for a similar expansion of consideration to those who currently stand 
outside the pale of legal personhood.  
Yet whatever the need for investigating such radical initiatives, it seems clear that wildlife lawyers 
should not allow themselves to become too carried away in their pursuit. The bulk of the research 
agenda, as reflected in the contributions to this work, should continue to be devoted to more 
mainstream issues, focusing on the tweaking of existing systems designed to secure measurable, if 
usually small-scale, improvements in the delivery of their fundamental objectives. Whatever the 
precise orientation of their efforts, moreover, researchers should prepare themselves for the 
dispiriting possibility that their labours may seem to have regrettably little discernible impact in 
practice, or even to go entirely unheeded. Hopefully, however, all such work will contribute in some 
way to the overall drip-feed of pressure by which governments and other key decision-makers are 
over the course of time imperceptibly affected. After all, the quantity of oxygen produced by a single 
cyanobacterium is doubtless infinitesimally small, but collectively they have created the essential 
conditions under which all the more complex life-forms, including ourselves, could develop.    
So, too, in the sphere of international environmental governance, the chorus of pressure emerging 
from various disciplines has already produced some highly significant and promising developments 
during the Decade for Biodiversity. And if it should sometimes seem discouraging that more 
dramatic progress is so difficult to come by in this context, wildlife lawyers will simply have to find 
ways of stiffening their resolve, using whatever form of metaphorical starch might come to hand; 
perhaps it will help to be reminded that their collective efforts are devoted to securing the processes 
by which the literal version of this complex chemical is generated, and hence to preserving the very 
staff of life itself, not only for themselves, but for their children and their children’s children. 
If, on the other hand, the need is felt for some more tangible form of incentive and inspiration to 
motivate endeavours in this field, it always pays to remember that there are certainly plenty of 
individual conservation success stories to hold on to amongst the standard tales of doom and 
gloom.217 Here is one that holds particular significance for me.  
From my schooldays in the 1960s, I recall the graphic accounts in the media regarding the collapse of 
peregrine falcon numbers in the UK and elsewhere, as the calamitous effect of pesticides upon their 
breeding success served to exacerbate the more traditional threats posed to them by habitat 
encroachment and direct human persecution.218 Indeed, their decline seemed almost as precipitate 
as the spectacular aerial ‘stoops’ by which they hurtle down on their unsuspecting prey. I knew little 
about such matters at the time, but, growing up in the London area, it was difficult to understand 
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how such seemingly exotic creatures could possibly survive at all in a country that was so heavily 
urbanised and industrialised, whatever protective measures might be put in place.  
Twenty years later, when I was established in a career as a university lecturer and contemplating the 
introduction of wildlife conservation into the Nottingham legal curriculum for the first time, I heard 
of the recolonisation by a pair of peregrines of one of their traditional breeding sites at Symonds Yat, 
a rocky outcrop along the River Wye, on the Gloucester/Herefordshire border. The Royal Society for 
the Protection of Birds had established a wardenship scheme and a public viewpoint across the river, 
in the hopes of garnering popular support for their attempts to translate formal protective 
legislation for this species into practical conservation success. Like thousands of others, I went to see 
these magnificent birds, though without really knowing whether their reappearance at this site 
signalled a genuine recovery in numbers, or was merely a last, defiant gesture in the death throes of 
the species in Britain. Whatever the truth of that particular saga, wildlife law duly secured a foothold 
in the curriculum, initially as part of a single, optional course in international environmental law 
designed to serve our new LLM degree in international law.  
Now, a further thirty years on, the international law of biodiversity seems well entrenched here, 
with 50 undergraduate subscribers this session and a regular cohort of postgraduate students, some 
of whom devote their entire master’s programme to the study of environmental law.  And should 
you be more concerned (as I hope you will be) about the actual targets of all this academic attention, 
it may interest you to note that, as I left the building after the first seminar of the 2015-2016 session, 
a peregrine falcon could be seen hunting from the clock tower almost immediately above the room 
in which the class had taken place: so successful, indeed, has been the recovery programme for the 
species globally that their conservation status is now categorised as “Least Concern” by IUCN. Iconic, 
once gravely imperilled, raptors silhouetted against the evening sky, apparently flourishing on the 
fringes of a major conurbation set in the heart of the English industrial midlands219 – now that is a 
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